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Policy Summary
At a time of growing consensus that conventional policy approaches to pover 
ty via the welfare system are ineffective, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) 
has gained increased political support and funding. Virtually all legislative pro 
grams that address the problems of poverty and welfare dependency, the authors 
note, now include an expanded role for EIC.
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a transfer program that operates through 
the income tax system to provide an income grant (technically a refundable 
tax credit) to low- and moderate-income working families with children. It 
is unique among transfer programs in that it provides its maximum credit to 
families with some designated positive level of earned income, but provides 
no benefits at all to families with no earned income. Unlike the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children program, married couples are eligible for the same 
EIC benefits as single-parent families with the same income. In contrast to 
the minimum wage, the EIC is well-targetted, since it is based on a household's 
total annual income rather than on an individual's hourly wage. The EIC is 
a public policy of growing importance which is supported virtually across the 
political spectrum, since it is consistent with the basic principles of both a liberal 
and a conservative antipoverty strategy.
With the increasing concern over the well-being of the working poor in re 
cent years, numerous proposals to expand the EIC program have been 
developed. In the 101st Congress, separate Senate and House bills are being 
considered in a House-Senate Conference Committee. The main contribution 
of this study is its analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the current pro 
gram and also of the likely effects of adjustments to the EIC. The authors 
describe the Earned Income Tax Credit as "a policy whose time on the na 
tional agenda has clearly come."
IX
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Introduction
The decade of the 1980s was a difficult time for policy makers con 
cerned with the problems of poverty. The decade began with a reces 
sion that pushed the poverty rate in 1982 and 1983 to its highest level 
in almost 20 years. Despite the improvement in the economy since then, 
the poverty rate at the end of the decade was still higher than at any 
time during the 1970s. The 1980s also saw declining poverty rates for 
the elderly coincide with rising poverty rates for children. In 1987, for 
example, one child in five lived in poverty, and for children under age 
six it was almost one in four. Attention was also focused on the 
"underclass" (Wilson 1987), a group composed of families in concen 
trated poverty areas and beset with behavioral problems that allegedly 
left them unable to join in mainstream economic life.
Politically, the decade saw efforts to re-evaluate the success of the 
"welfare state" and to scale back the "safety net." There was also 
a growing consensus that conventional policy approaches to the pover 
ty population via the welfare system were ineffective, or even counter 
productive. Charles Murray (1984) first advanced this argument in Los 
ing Ground, but it was subsequently endorsed in some respects by the 
Family Support Act with its emphasis on work requirements and job 
training.
One income transfer program that has managed not only to escape 
criticism but, indeed, has gained increased political support and fund 
ing is the Earned Income Tax Credit or EIC. What began as a small 
program in 1975 with the modest intent of offsetting Social Security 
payroll taxes for low-income workers with children has now become 
a rallying point in redirecting poverty policy. Indeed, the EIC now often 
seems to be the policy of choice for a wide range of problems ranging 
from the minimum wage ("increase the EIC instead") to child care 
("adjust the EIC for family size"). Both liberals and conservatives, 
Democrats and Republicans, have offered legislation involving EIC ad 
justments and extensions.
2 Introduction
What is the EIC and why is it suddenly so popular? Simply put, the 
EIC is an income-transfer program that operates through the tax system 
to provide an income grant (technically, a refundable tax credit) to low- 
income working households with children. In 1990, it provided a max 
imum of $953 and an average of over $550 to roughly 10 million 
families.
The popularity of the EIC program derives from its unique design 
that clearly distinguishes it from conventional welfare programs. Unlike 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program which 
provides maximum benefits to families who do not work, EIC provides 
its maximum credit to families with some designated positive level of 
earned income; in 1990 the maximum benefit, $953, was obtained by 
households with earnings between $6,810 and $10,734. Families with 
no earned income receive no benefits at all under EIC. Also unlike 
AFDC, married couples are eligible for the same benefits as single- 
parent families with the same income. Thus, EIC can be thought of 
as endorsing and financially supporting both work and marriage. The 
same cannot be said of AFDC.
As a way to supplement the income of low-wage workers, EIC also 
fares well in comparison with an increase in the minimum wage. The 
minimum wage is a poorly targeted program, raising wages not only 
for low-wage heads of household but also for many low-wage workers  
primarily teenagers in middle- and high-income families. Moreover, 
the minimum wage will generate involuntary unemployment whenever 
the legal minimum exceeds the market wage. The burden of involun 
tary unemployment falls heavily on low-earning households and poor 
teenagers.
In contrast, the EIC is well-targeted, since it is based on a household's 
total annual income, rather than an individual's hourly wage. Moreover, 
only families with children are eligible. In addition, the EIC does not 
generate involuntary unemployment. It may raise or lower labor sup 
ply, as we will explain in chapter 3, but at the wage that results, labor 
demand equals labor supply, in sharp contrast to the excess supply of 
labor generated by a minimum wage.
Finally, a modified EIC can be a vehicle for addressing the issue of 
child care. A modified EIC would adjust the benefits it provides to the
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size of the family and/or the age of children. Although the 1990 EIC 
does not adjust benefits in this way, both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives approved legislation in the 101st Congress that would 
include such a provision.
The EIC currently enjoys broad support across the political spectrum 
because it is consistent with the basic principles of both a "liberal" 
and a "conservative" antipoverty strategy. Let's consider the role of 
the EIC in each strategy.
The liberal envisions the EIC as a supplement to, not a replacement 
for, welfare. The working poor are not necessarily more worthy or de 
serving than the nonworking poor, but they need help and are ill-treated 
by AFDC, so an EIC is a useful policy. The financing of EIC should 
not come at the expense of welfare. Most liberals see the EIC as a com 
plement to, not a substitute for, a relatively high minimum wage. 
Although some liberals recognize that a high minimum wage will reduce 
the number of jobs employers offer low-skilled persons, many morally 
object to very low wages and are impressed with the fact that the ma 
jority of low-skilled workers remain employed under a high minimum 
wage.
Where does the EIC fit into the larger liberal strategy? Liberals might 
prefer a single transfer system that targets all individuals in need 
regardless of work status. Also, liberals (unless they are economists) 
generally support a high minimum wage. But the liberal recognizes that 
conservative citizens who are unwilling to support welfare or a high 
minimum wage may be willing to support the EIC. Thus, it seems sen 
sible to try to obtain as much conservative support as possible for the 
EIC, while at the same time resisting cuts in welfare and pressing for 
a higher minimum wage.
Conservatives, on the other hand, envision the EIC as a replacement 
for welfare for nonelderly, able-bodied people. They believe that the 
working poor are generally more worthy and deserving than the non- 
working, nonelderly, able-bodied poor, and that government assistance 
should be targeted on them rather than those who do not work. The 
financing of EIC, according to conservatives, should come at the ex 
pense of welfare.
4 Introduction
The EIC should substitute for raising the minimum wage. Permit 
ting employers to offer jobs at low wages will result in more jobs being 
offered and reduce unemployment for low-skilled persons willing to 
work. Even if a person begins in a low-wage job, the EIC supplement 
will compensate for the low wage, and responsible work effort should 
enable the individual to earn wage increases and promotions.
Some conservatives support varying the EIC with the number of 
children as an alternative to child-care programs that directly subsidize 
providers of child care. Other conservatives oppose varying the EIC 
with the number of children (as well as alternative child-care programs) 
because they do not want to encourage poor people to have large families. 
To limit the total cost of EIC, most conservatives would probably sup 
port exclusion of the childless working poor.
Thus, although liberal and conservative strategies often conflict, the 
EIC appears to have an important role to play in each strategy.
In this monograph, we take a close and careful look at the EIC pro 
gram. We look at its strengths and its weaknesses, its current effects, 
and also the likely effects of adjustments in the EIC program. We com 
pare it to alternative policies intended to provide financial assistance 
to low income families.
As is, perhaps, inevitable in writing about important public policy 
issues, the policies themselves change even as one tries to analyze them. 
This is especially true for a policy like the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
whose time in the national agenda has clearly come.
When we began this research, expansion of the EIC had been con 
sidered in the 100th Congress, but no action was taken. As we worked 
(in 1989), the House Ways and Means Committee approved a substan 
tial expansion of the EIC program as part of a new legislative initiative 
on child care. That bill, which included an increase in EIC benefits and 
an adjustment of benefits for family size, did not, however, reach the 
floor of the House during that legislative session. * At about the same 
time, the Senate passed its own child care bill, the Act for Better Child 
Care Services. The Senate version included a much more modest ex 
pansion of the EIC program, limited to families with children under 
age four. Finally, after we finished this monograph and just as this 
volume went to press (in the spring of 1990), the full House of Represen-
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tatives approved the EIC provisions of the original Ways and Means 
Committee day-care bill as part of the Early Childhood Education and 
Development Act.
As we write this, the future of the EIC program is uncertain. There 
will undoubtedly be changes, but the extent of those changes is still 
hard to predict. The House and Senate versions differ quite signficant- 
ly in terms of EIC expansion, and a conference committee must, 
therefore, reconcile those differences. The House version is more than 
twice as expensive as the Senate version, and some compromise on the 
EIC expansion is a genuine possibility. And even then, a presidential 
veto is a distinct possibility, especially if the version reported out of 
conference retains many of the features of the House bill. Child-care 
legislation, supported by President Bush but never passed by either the 
House or the Senate, was similar to, but yet more modest than, the Senate 
version with respect to its EIC provisions.
Our approach in this monograph has been dictated, in part, by these 
developments. Where possible, we have tried to emphasize general prin 
ciples and effects that are common to any and all EIC programs. No 
matter what happens to the EIC program in the Congress this session 
or in the future, these ideas will be valid, and, we hope, useful as well.
Where we have needed to turn to specifics to explain, for example, 
exactly how the EIC program works we have used the law as it stood 
in 1990. Where we have tried to describe who benefits from the EIC, 
how much in benefits different groups receive, and what effects the EIC 
might have on the economy, we have used the EIC law as it stood it 
1988. Our reasons for doing this are explained in chapter 2. Fortunate 
ly, the EIC law in 1988 and the EIC law in 1990 are identical in all 
important respects. Finally, where we considered expansion and reform 
of the EIC program, we included among our alternatives a specifica 
tion that is very similar to the legislation passed by the House of 
Representatives.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the EIC: how the EIC works and 
what it does. Chapter 2 uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
data to estimate the distribution of EIC benefits in 1988 among the 
population and to describe some of the characteristics of the popula 
tion of EIC recipients. Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of EIC on labor
6 Introduction
supply decisions. Chapter 4 compares the EIC to other antipoverty 
policies, including a negative income tax (NIT), welfare (AFDC), an 
increase in the minimum wage, and a wage-subsidy plan. Chapter 5 
uses the PSID data to estimate the likely impact of a number of expan 
sions and adjustments of the EIC program. Finally, chapter 6 considers 
how to increase the EIC participation rate.
NOTE
1. The bill was dropped after a split emerged among the chief sponsors over whether funding 
should emphasize direct grants to states or a combination of grants and tax credits (EIC) and whether 
church-related child care centers should be eligible for the provisions of the bill.
1
An Overview
of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit (ETC) provides assistance through the 
tax system to low-earning households with children. To benefit from 
the EIC, a household must have at least one dependent child, positive 
labor earnings, and total income less than a specified ceiling. Thus, the 
EIC helps working parents with modest incomes.
The EIC is a tax credit on the federal personal income tax. Like any 
tax credit, it enables an eligible household to reduce the tax it would 
otherwise pay. For example, if a household's tax would have been $550, 
but its EIC tax credit is $300, then the household must only pay $250 
in tax.
Significantly, the EIC is a refundable tax credit. This means that if 
the tax credit exceeds the tax the household would otherwise owe (the 
tax-before-credit), then the government pays the household the difference. 
For example, if a household's tax-before-credit is $250, but its EIC tax 
credit is $550, then the government will pay the household $300.
A significant feature of the EIC is that it is based on the household, 
not the individual. The household's total income determines the 
household's EIC credit.
History of the EIC
The Earned Income Tax Credit, which emerged in the late 1980s as 
an important antipoverty policy, began quietly and modestly in 1975 so 
quietly that for many years it was virtually unnoticed by the general 
public, in sharp contrast to welfare (AFDC) and the minimum wage. 
Even many antipoverty strategists have only recently begun to emphasize 
the EIC.
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Why was the EIC enacted? One rationale was simply to offset the Social 
Security payroll tax for low-income households with children. Prior to 
1975, a chronic complaint against the Social Security payroll tax had 
been its regressivity. The payroll tax was proportional to wages up to 
a ceiling. Unlike the income tax, which included personal exemptions 
and a standard deduction, the payroll tax began with the first $100 of 
earnings.
But if the payroll tax was viewed as the problem, why not exempt 
the first few thousand dollars of wage income from payroll tax? Evidently, 
it was thought that this would complicate the employer's task of implemen 
ting the payroll tax for Social Security. Also, it might weaken the political 
claim of these workers to Social Security benefits upon retirement. So 
Congress decided to leave the payroll tax alone, but return the money 
to low-income households through a credit on the personal income tax.
Of course, some antipoverty strategists saw a more ambitious pur 
pose for the EIC: to reward work effort and supplement the earnings 
of low-income households with children. Here was a policy aimed at 
a clientele with which many citizens sympathized: working families, in 
cluding married-couple families, with modest incomes, who were often 
excluded from other income-transfer programs. This broader purpose 
yielded an important corollary: the amount of EIC supplement might 
exceed the amount of Social Security payroll tax. The citizenry might 
decide to more than compensate working parents for their payroll tax 
burden.
The magnitude of the EIC credit has been raised periodically since 
it was enacted. The maximum credit was $400 from 1976-1978, $500 
from 1979-1984, $550 in 1985-1986, and has been raised each year since 
then. In 1990 the maximum credit was $953.
In the 101st Congress (1989-1990) both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives passed child-care legislation that involved a substantial 
expansion of the EIC program. While the specific form of the new EIC 
program is still uncertain (as of April 1990), it is very likely that the 
basic credit will be increased and will be adjusted for the number and/or 
age of the children in a family. The changes will probably be effective 
in 1991.
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Mechanics of the EIC
In this section, we focus on the mechanics of how the EIC works and 
on its interaction with the federal income tax system. To illustrate this, 
we use the actual numerical parameters of the EIC program and the tax 
system as of 1990. Although the EIC program will probably be somewhat 
different in 1991 and beyond, its basic structure the features that set 
EIC apart from other transfer programs will not change. Thus, our 
exposition of the EIC in 1990 will apply, with only minor modifica 
tions, to the EIC program in the near future.
To simplify our exposition, we first consider a household whose in 
come consists solely of labor earnings. In the following section, we ex 
amine how the EIC program works when a household also has nonlabor
income.
There are two distinguishing features of an EIC that can be quickly 
grasped in figure 1.1. First, if a household has no earnings (E=0), it 
receives no credit (C=0), so the EIC is clearly restricted to households 
with labor earnings. Second, the EIC begins with a phase-in range where 
the credit rises as the household's labor earnings rise, and ends with 
a phase-out range where the credit fells as earnings continue to rise.
Figure 1.1 
EIC Schedule
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Under an EIC, the government must designate the level of earnings, 
Em , at which the phase-in range ends and the credit reaches its max 
imum, Cm . Then, the credit must be gradually phased-out as earnings 
rise. The phase-out, however, need not begin immediately. As shown 
in figure 1.1, the EIC phase-out can be delayed by having a stationary 
range where the credit remains constant at Cm as the household's earn 
ings increase. But at some earnings level Eb , the phase-out must begin, 
so that the credit declines with the further rise in the household's earn 
ings until at some level of earnings Ee , the phase-out ends as the credit 
reaches zero.
Figure 1.2 shows the actual EIC schedule for 1990. If the household's 
earnings are zero, its credit is zero. When the household earns its first 
$100, it receives a credit of $14; it continues to receive $14 for each ad 
ditional $100 of earnings until E reaches $6,810 and the credit reaches 
$953 (14 percent of $6,810). There is a stationary range from $6,810 to 
$10,734 where the credit remains $953. The phase-out begins at $10,734. 
The phase-out rate is 10 percent; for each additional $100 of earnings, 
the credit is reduced by $10. Since the maximum credit is $953, it takes 
$9,530 of additional earnings to completely phase-out the credit. This 
occurs at Ee =$20,264 ($10,734-t-$9,530=$20,264).
Figure 1.2 
~ EIC Schedule 1990
$953
$6,810 $10,734 $20,264
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Under the 1990 EIC schedule, the credit C for a household with labor 
earnings E (equal to adjusted gross income AGI) is given by: 1
C=.14E ifE<6,810,
C=953 if 6,810 <E< 10,734,
C=953-.1(E-10,734) if 10,734 <E< 20,264,
C=0 if E> 20,264.
The level of earnings at which the phase-out ends, Ee , is obtained 
by setting C=0 in the third equation and solving for E:
0=953-.1(E-10,734), so Ee =20,264.
Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the phase-in and phase-out thresholds 
(Em and Ej,) are automatically adjusted each year for inflation.
In the phase-out range, for every additional $100 of earnings, the EIC 
credit is reduced $10, so the household's net gain (after earning an addi 
tional $100) is only $90. This is the same situation that an ordinary tax 
payer would face if she were in a 10 percent tax bracket. Thus, it is as 
though the EIC recipient in the phase-out range faces a marginal tax 
rate (MTR) of 10 percent.
In the phase-in range, by contrast, the EIC recipient faces a negative 
marginal tax rate equal to -14 percent, because for every $100 of earn 
ings, the individual gains $114. Thus, the current EIC is characterized 
by three marginal tax rates: -14 percent in the phase-in range, zero per 
cent in the stationary range, and +10 percent in the phase-out range. 
Note that the MTR has the same magnitude as the phase-in or phase- 
out rate.
The EIC, however, is not the only determinant of a household's 
marginal tax rate. When a household's earnings reach a threshold, the 
household enters the positive tax system. It is the interaction of the EIC 
and the positive tax system that determines the household's marginal 
tax rate, and whether the household receives a net payment from the 
government (because its EIC credit exceeds its tax-before-credit), or must 
make a net payment to the government (because its EIC credit is less 
than its tax-before-credit).
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The interaction of the EIC and the tax system is shown in figure 1.3 
for a family of four. In 1990, with the personal exemption equal to $2,050 
and the standard deduction equal to $5,450, this family enters the positive 
tax system when its adjusted gross income reaches $13,650 ((4 x $2,050) 
-I-$5,450=$13,650). It is then subject to a 15 percent tax rate on earn 
ings above $13,650. When its earnings equal $16,296, its tax (before EIC 
credit) is $397, but its EIC credit is also $397, so $16,296 is the "break 
even" earnings Ev .2 The EIC schedule and the positive tax schedule 
overlap from $13,650 to $20,264.
Figure 1.3 
EIC and Tax Schedules 1990
CT
$953
$397
$6,810 $10,734 $13,650 $16,296 $20,264
The range where the EIC phase-out overlaps with the positive tax 
system (E=$13,650 to E=$20,264) is especially significant. We know 
that the EIC phase-out alone imposes a marginal tax rate equal to the 
phase-out rate 10 percent because for each additional $100 of earn 
ings, the credit is reduced $10 so the net gain is only $90. The positive 
tax schedule alone imposes an MTR equal to the tax rate 15 percent  
because for each additional $100 of earnings, the tax is $15 so the net 
gain is only $85. Together, the EIC and positive tax system impose an
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MTR equal to 25 percent (10 percent+15 percent), the sum of the phase- 
out rate and the tax rate. For each additional $100 of earnings, the credit 
is reduced $10 and the tax is $15 so the net gain is only $75. Thus, in 
the range where the EIC and the positive tax schedule overlap, the max 
imum MTR occurs, and this maximum MTR equals the sum of the EIC 
phase-out rate and the tax rate.
As shown in figure 1.4, when earnings are between zero and $20,264, 
a family of four faces five different marginal tax rates due to the in 
teraction of EIC and the positive tax system: -14 percent, 0 percent, 
10 percent, 25 percent (the sum of the EIC phase-out rate of 10 percent 
and the tax rate of 15 percent), and 15 percent.
Figure 1.4 
Marginal Tax Rates
25% 
15%
-14%
MTR
$6,810 $10,734 $13,650
MTR
$20,264
Figure 1.5 shows how household net income I (defined as its earnings 
E plus its EIC credit C minus its tax T) varies with its earnings E for 
a family of four that takes the standard deduction. The 45 degree line 
with a slope of 1.00 is drawn to enable a visual comparison of I and 
E. If the I schedule is above the 45 degree line, then I exceeds E. This 
is true until E reaches $16,296, the break-even earnings Ev, where the 
I schedule intersects the 45 degree line.
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Figure 1.5 
Income vs. Earnings
$16,296
$7,763          
$6,810 $10,734 $13,650 $16,296 $20,264
The slope of the I schedule equals (1-MTR); for example, in the range 
where the EIC phase-out overlaps with the positive tax schedule 
(E=$13,650 to E=$20,264), the slope is (l-.25)=.75, because each ad 
ditional $100 of earnings results in a net gain of $75. Thus, the slope 
of the I schedule takes on five different values from zero to $20,264, 
corresponding to the five different marginal tax rates: 1.14, 1.00, .90, 
.75, and .85.
The EIC and Adjusted Gross Income
We now consider a complication. In fact, the EIC phase-in depends 
on a household's labor income, but the EIC phase-out depends on either 
the household's adjusted gross income or its labor income.
Adjusted gross income (AGI), as defined by the U.S. tax code, equals 
labor income plus capital income (property income such as interest, 
dividends, capital gains, or rental income) plus several items (such as 
unemployment compensation) minus several items (such as an individual 
retirement account deduction). Although a household's AGI is usually 
larger than its labor income, it is possible for it to be smaller due to 
the items that are subtracted in computing AGI.
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Suppose a household has $6,810 of income in 1990. If the income 
is all from labor, the household obtains the maximum EIC credit, $953. 
If, however, the income is all from capital, the household obtains no 
EIC credit. Suppose instead that a household has $20,264 of income. 
It obtains no EIC credit, regardless of the source of the income. Thus, 
if the household has $6,810 of labor income, and $13,454 of capital 
income, it obtains no EIC credit, even though it would have obtained 
the maximum EIC credit, $953, if it had no capital income. Thus, an 
increase in capital income phases out the EIC credit just as does an in 
crease in labor income.
The reason for the phase-in by labor earnings and phase-out by ad 
justed gross income or labor earnings should be evident. One purpose 
of the EIC is to encourage work and reward work effort. The phase-in 
must therefore be based on labor earnings. However, another purpose 
of the EIC is to assist households in financial need. The phase-out should 
therefore be triggered by either adjusted gross income or labor earnings.
Thus, the 1990 EIC schedule is given by:
If AGI < 10,734:
C = .14E ifE<6,810, 
C=953 if 6,810<E< 10,734, 
C=953-.1(E-10,734) if 10,734 <E<20,264, 
C=0 if E> 20,264.
If AGI > 10,734:
C=Min[C(E),C(A)], the smaller of C(E) and C(A), where C(E) 
is the credit given by the above formula for C, and C(A) is the 
credit given by that formula when AGI replaces E. 3
The distinction between labor earnings and adjusted gross income 
justifies the overlapping of the EIC range and the positive tax range. 
We can explain this point by recalling our earlier example of a family 
of four, shown in figure 1.3.
When its earnings exceed $13,650, the family enters the positive tax 
system. Between E=$13,650 and E=$20,264, the family has both a 
tax-before-credit T and an EIC credit C. When E is less than $16,296,
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C is greater than T, so the IRS makes a net payment to the family; con 
versely, when E is greater than $16,296, C is less than T, so the family 
makes a net payment to the IRS. When E equals $16,296, C equals 
T, so no net payment is made; we call $16,296 the break-even level 
of earnings.
It might be asked: Why not net out T and C in the first place? Clear 
ly, E=$16,296 is the key level of earnings for a family of four. If E 
is less than $16,296, the family receives a net payment from the IRS; 
if E is greater than $16,296, the family makes a net payment to the 
IRS. We can compute the net credit for any E below $16,296, and the 
net tax for any E above $16,296. Why not present the household with 
a net EIC schedule for E less than $16,296, and a net tax schedule for 
E greater than $16,296? Then the household would either receive a re 
fundable EIC credit, or pay a tax, but not both. Moreover, it would 
then be clear that E=$16,296 divides the population between net recip 
ients and net payers. 4
If the only kind of income were labor earnings, this netting out would 
make sense. But now consider two households. Household L earns 
only labor income while household K earns only capital income. Citizens 
may feel differently about the two kinds of income. For example, citizens 
may want household K to begin making a net payment to the IRS when 
its capital income exceeds $13,650, while they may want household 
L to begin making a net payment to the IRS only when its labor income 
exceeds $16,296. If so, then the overlapping of the EIC and tax schedules 
implements this preference. For household K, the C schedule in figure 
1.3 is irrelevant, so it begins making a net payment to the IRS when 
its income exceeds $13,650.
The overlapping schedules imply that a household with only capital 
income begins making a net payment to the IRS at a lower income level 
than the household with only labor income. Citizens can specify two 
income levels: the income at which they want household K to begin 
making a net payment to the IRS ($13,650), and the income at which 
they want household L to begin making a net payment to the IRS 
($16,296). The overlapping of the schedules then implements this 
preference.
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Provisions of the U.S. EIC
To be eligible for the current U.S. EIC, a household must be sup 
porting at least one child. 5 Under provisions in effect in 1990, the first 
child triggers the credit, but then the credit does not vary with the number 
of children. Under the EIC expansion considered by the 1990 Congress, 
beginning in 1991 the credit would vary with the number of children. 
In chapter 5 we will analyze the impact of varying the credit with the 
number of children.
On the bottom of the first page of the 1989 1040 tax return, the 
household is alerted: "If this line [your adjusted gross income] is less 
than $19,340 and a child lived with you, see 'Earned Income Credit.' " 
What happens if the household neglects this warning, even though it 
is eligible for the EIC? The IRS is instructed to check each return to 
determine whether the household is entitled to credit. If it is, the IRS 
is instructed to calculate the credit for the household, and either reduce 
its tax liability or pay the household the correct amount. As long as 
the household files a return, it should get any EIC credit to which it 
is entitled.
Of course, the IRS can only help a household that files a tax return. 
Currently, households with very low incomes are not legally required 
to file (for example, a gross income of $13,650 in 1990 for a married 
couple with two children), so there are undoubtedly households that 
do not receive the credit to which they are entitled. In chapter 6, we 
offer a proposal to address this shortcoming of the current EIC.
In theory, the household need not wait until its 1040 return is pro 
cessed to receive its credit. Under the advance payment option, the credit 
can be received with each paycheck. In practice, however, only a small 
fraction of households receive credit through the advance payment op 
tion. In chapter 6, we assess the advance payment option.
The current 1040 return is virtually certain to confuse a household 
about how the EIC works. A clear return would first have the taxpayer 
calculate tax liability before credits, then let the taxpayer subtract all 
credits including the EIC to obtain tax owed. Tax owed would then 
be compared with tax withheld to determine who must write a check: 
the household or the government.
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But, surprisingly, the EIC is not included in the credits section where 
it belongs. Instead, it is included later in Repayments section, where 
the taxpayer is instructed to add the EIC credit to federal income tax 
withheld. This instruction does yield the correct answer. But it makes 
the EIC credit seem the same as tax withheld. In chapter 6, we suggest 
how the 1040 return can be revised so that a taxpayer can easily grasp 
the meaning of the EIC.
Table 1.1 shows the evolution for selected years since 1976 of the 
EIC rates (phase-in rate pl and phase-out rate pj and thresholds (the 
earnings Em at which maximum credit Cm is reached, the earnings Eb 
at which the phase-out begins, and the earnings Ee at which the phase- 
out ends). The initial EIC was a simple symmetrical EIC with 
pi =p0 =10 percent, no stationary range, Em =Eb =$4,000 and 
Ee =$8,000. Not until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were the thresholds 
adjusted automatically (indexed) for inflation.
In 1979 the stationary range made its debut, and the phase-out rate 
p0 was made unequal to the phase-in rate p4 . But note that the phase- 
out rate (12.5 percent) was greater than the phase-in rate (10 percent) 
in 1979, while the phase-out rate since 1987 (10 percent) has been less 
than the phase-in rate (14 percent).
Table 1.2 shows the total amount of EIC credit and the number of 
families receiving credit. For 1990, it is projected that of the $5.9 billion 
of EIC credits, $4.8 billion will be checks written by the government 
to households, while $1.1 billion will reduce households' tax liability. 
Thus, "reftmdability" is extremely important. In 1990, roughly 80 per 
cent ($4.8 billion out of $5.9 billion) of the total EIC credit would be 
eliminated if the EIC were not refundable. 7 Roughly 10.3 million families 
will receive credit, and the average credit per family will be $567.
In 1986, the number of families obtaining advance payment was very 
small, roughly 10,000 out of 6.3 million; the amount received was on 
ly $2.2 million out of $2.0 billion. Over 560,000 returns that did not 
claim credit were given credit after the IRS check of the return. Thus, 
about 9 percent of households who received credit (560,000 out of
Table 1.1
Earned Income Credit Parameters, Selected Years 
1976-1990
Year
1976
1979
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
Pi
10%
10
11
14
14
14
14
SOURCE: Committee on Ways
Em
$4,000
5,000
5,000
6,080
6,240
6,500
6,810
and Means 1990,
cm
$400
500
550
851
874
910
953
table 15, p. 834.
Po
10.00%
12.50
12.22
10.00
10.00
10.00
10.00
Eb
$ 4,000
6,000
6,500
6,920
9,840
10,240
10,730
Ee
$ 8,000
10,000
11,000
15,432
18,576
19,340
20,264
fn'
o*-h
s
n
Table 1.2 
EIC Credit: Amounts and Coverage, Selected Years
Year
1976
1980
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988a
1989a
19903
1991 a
Total amount
of credit
(millions)
$1,295
1,986
1,638
2,088
2,009
3,931
4,807
5,368
5,858
6,310
1976-1991
Number of families
who received credit
(thousands)
6,473
6,954
5,759
6,500
6,277
8,738
9,116
9,805
10,333
10,633
Refunded portion
of credit
(millions)
$ 890
1,370
1,162
1,499
1,479
2,930
4,281
4,412
4,759
5,113
Average credit
per family
$200
286
284
321
320
450
527
547
567
593
Overview
a,
s
n
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means 1990, table 17, p. 837. 
a. Projection.
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6.3 million) failed to claim it on their returns. We do not have an estimate 
of the number of households that are entitled to credit but do not receive 
it because they do not file a tax return.
Table 1.3 shows how projected 1991 EIC benefits are distributed 
across income classes. Households with income under $20,000 receive 
roughly 85 percent of the total EIC credit of $6.3 billion.
Table 1.3 
Projected Distribution of EIC, 1991
Income class 
(thousands)
$0 to $10
$10 to $20
$20 to $30
$30 to $40
$40 to $50
$50 to $75
$75 to $100
$100 to $200
$200 and over
Total
All returns 
(thousands)
1,953
5,679
2,768
185
26
13
6
0
0
10,633
Amount of credit 
(millions)
$1,393
4,000
822
74
12
5
4
0
0
6,310
SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means 1990, table 19, p. 839.
Conclusion
The earned income tax credit (EIC) has moved from relative obscurity 
when it began in the mid-1970s to center stage as the 1990s begin. After 
more than a decade in the shadow of welfare and the minimum wage, 
the EIC has emerged as the antipoverty policy that commands support 
across the political spectrum. The key reason for this broad support 
is its unique design. It helps an important segment of low-income 
households those who work and earn.
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Chapter 1 Appendix 
The Algebra of the Earned Income Tax Credit
We begin with the simpler case where adjusted gross income (AGI) equals 
labor earnings (E). Then we consider the case where AGI differs from E. Final 
ly, we consider the interaction of the credit with the income tax schedule.
AGI equals E
Em = earnings at which the phase-in range ends and the credit reaches its
maximum, Cm
Eb = earnings at which the phase-out begins
Ee = earnings at which the phase-out ends as the credit reaches zero 
pj = phase-in rate 
p0 = phase-out rate
The credit C for a household with labor earnings E is given by: 
C = PiEifE<Em , 
C = Cm =PiEm ifEm <E<Eb , 
C =Cm - Po(E-Eb)ifEb <E<Ee , 
C =OifE>Ee .
To obtain Ee , set C=Cm-p0(E-Eb)=0 and solve for E to obtain: 
Ee = (Cm/Po)+Eb =(PiEm/p0)+Eb.
AGI Differs from E
Note that although AGI is usually greater than or equal to E, it is possible 
for AGI to be smaller than E due to items that may be subtracted in computing 
AGI.
If AGI<Eb :
C = PiEifE<Em ,
C =Cm = PiEm ifEm <E<Eb ,
C =Cm-Po(E-Eb)ifEb <E<Ee,
C =OifE>Ee .
If AGI>Eb :
C = Min[C(E),C(A)], the smaller of C(E) and C(A), where C(E) is the 
credit given by the above formula for C, and C(A) is the credit given 
by that formula when AGI replaces E.
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Interaction with the Income Tax Schedule
The tax-before-credit T is given by T=t(E-Ex), where Ex is the earnings 
exempt from tax due to the standard deduction and personal exemptions and 
t is the tax rate. The break-even earnings Ev is the E at which the tax given 
by T=t(E-Ex) equals the credit given by C=Cm-p0(E-Eb). Setting T=C, we 
solve for E to obtain
Hv =(tEx +Cm + PoEb)/(t+ Po).
Income-after-tax-and-credit is I=E-T+C. In the range where the tax and credit 
interact,
I = E-t(E-Ex)+Cm-Po(E-Eb), so 
I = [l-(t+Po)]E+tEx +Cm +p0Eb .
Note that dI/dE = [l-(t+p0)].
The implicit marginal tax rate (MTR) is defined by:
(!-MTR)=dI/dE. Since dI/dE=[l-(t+p0)], MTR=t+p0 .
NOTES
1. Although we have used a formula to describe the 1990 EIC schedule, the actual schedule con 
sists of discrete brackets in a table on the 1040 personal income tax return. The formula approx 
imates the numbers the taxpayer would actually obtain from the tax return table. The phase-out 
in the 1990 table actually begins at $10,730 rather than $10,734. The number that fits the formula 
exactly ($10,734 instead of $10,730) is presented here because it makes it easier to grasp how 
the EIC is constructed. An appendix to this chapter presents the algebra of the earned income 
tax credit.
2. We find Ev = 16,296 as follows. The tax T is T=.15(E - 13,650). The credit C is C=953 - 
.1(E - 10,734). T equals C where .15(E - 13,650) =953 - .1(E - 10,734). Solving for E yields 
Ey = 16,296. A formula for Ey is given in the appendix to this chapter.
3. A general treatment is given in the appendix to this chapter.
4. The break-even level of earnings would increase with family size due to the increase in per 
sonal exemptions. But the point is still the same. It might still be asked: For each family size, 
why not divide the population at the break-even level of earnings for that family size, so that 
the household would either receive an EIC credit, or pay a tax, but not both?
5. The following are eligible for the EIC: married individuals filing a joint return who are entitl 
ed to a dependency exemption for a child; surviving spouses with a dependent child; and unmar 
ried heads of households with a child. The household is judged to be supporting the child only 
if it finances more than half the expenses. If more than half of the household's income is from 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDQ, then the household is not eligible for the EIC.
6. The material in this section draws heavily from the Committee on Ways and Means (1990).
7. The refunded portion of the credit is the portion that exceeds tax liability; it is treated as a 
budget outlay. The rest of the credit is classified as a tax expenditure. Thus, in recent years the 
budget outlay has greatly exceeded the tax expenditure for EIC.

2 
A Profile
of the 
EIC Population
In this chapter, we take a detailed look at the EIC recipient popula 
tion in 1988. The only direct information on EIC receipt comes from 
published IRS tabulations on the total number of families receiving a 
credit, on the distribution of families across income classes, and on the 
average amount of credit received. But very little is known about who 
it is that receives EIC benefits or about how the amount of the credit 
varies across different groups. What fraction of working poor families 
receive EIC benefits? What fraction of EIC families are married couples 
who may receive few other benefits? What fraction of EIC families are 
poor? What are the average work hours and wages of workers in families 
receiving EIC benefits? Those are the questions we examine in this 
chapter.
We focus on the EIC program and the EIC population in 1988 because 
that was the most recent year with known EIC parameters at the time 
this research was conducted in mid-1989. Fortunately, the major features 
of the EIC program have been unchanged since 1988; the only difference 
is that the various income cutoff points have been adjusted annually 
for inflation. 1 As a result, the EIC recipient population in 1988 was 
probably very similar to the EIC population in 1990 and our findings 
for 1988 would almost certainly apply to 1990 as well.
We find that approximately one-third of all poor families and one- 
quarter of all black families received EIC benefits in 1988. Nevertheless, 
about 70 percent of the EIC population is white and three-quarters are 
nonpoor. The typical EIC family has a low-to-moderate income that 
places it above the poverty line; EIC benefits may well be the only in 
come assistance many of these families receive. We also find that the 
EIC population in 1988 appeared to be working relatively long hours
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at relatively low wages. Finally, the average credit in 1988 was still 
quite low under $500 in our data and not much above that in IRS 
tabulations so the contribution of the EIC program to the economic 
well-being of low- and moderate-income families was certainly quite 
modest.
The EIC Population in 1988
Procedures
Our description of the EIC population in 1988 is based on detailed 
information on the income and demographic traits of a nationally 
representative sample of about 5,600 nonelderly households taken from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Because the PSID is na 
tionally representative and provides extensive demographic and labor 
market information about families, it is suitable for drawing a com 
posite picture of the EIC population. 2
Before turning to our findings, it is important to understand the limita 
tions of the PSID data for this purpose and how we have tried to com 
pensate for those problems. First, the PSID does not ask directly about 
whether a family receives a credit through the EIC program. 3 It does, 
however, include information for each household on the amount of earn 
ed income, the amount of adjusted gross income, and whether or not 
there are children in the family the three factors that are used to 
calculate the credit. Thus, it is possible to determine whether a par 
ticular family would have been eligible for EIC and to compute the 
amount of credit for which it would be eligible. 4
When we do that for 1984 the most recent year for which the PSID 
data were available at the time of this study and compare it to the in 
formation published by the IRS on EIC receipt in 1984, we find that 
the two sets of estimates are very similar. IRS tabulations show an 
average credit of $284 per family (the maximum credit in 1984 was 
$500) and a recipient population of just under 5.8 million families, while 
the PSID computations yield an average credit of $252 and a recipient 
population of about six million families. This suggests that the indirect 
EIC calculation that we use is quite accurate and that the PSID yields 
an EIC recipient population that is very close to the true EIC population.
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The second problem is not as easy to resolve. Ideally, to describe 
the EIC population in 1988, one would use a data set that provided in 
formation for a representative national sample of families in 1988. Un 
fortunately, because of the time lags associated with collecting and releas 
ing survey data, current data are not available. And since the EIC pro 
gram changed substantially between 1984 and 1988, a picture of the 
EIC population in 1984 would tell us very little about the EIC popula 
tion in 1990.
What we do, therefore, is use the 1984 PSID demographic data and 
"update" all 1984 income terms to 1988 values using 1984-1988 in 
come growth factors from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to create 
a "pseudo-1988" PSID data set. The growth factors are disaggregated 
by race and by 1984 income on the basis of income quintile points 
reported in the 1984 and 1987 CPS. We assumed an increase in nominal 
income of 5 percent between 1987 and 1988.
While this is clearly an imperfect procedure, the resulting data ap 
pear reasonable. 5 For example, comparing the actual 1984 data and the 
pseudo-1988 data, we find that the poverty rate for nonelderly families 
fell about 6 percent between 1984 and 1988. That decline is comparable 
to the actual change over that time period.
Moreover, the two sets of EIC figures are reasonably close, especially 
with allowance for the fact that the reported IRS numbers are estimates. 
For 1988, the IRS reported an average credit per person of $527 and 
a recipient population of 9.1 million, while the estimate derived from 
the PSID for 1988 is $486 with a recipient population of about 10 million 
families. While we would certainly prefer to use a genuine 1988 data 
set, the updated 1984 data set appears to be a decent approximation. 
We do, however, urge reasonable caution in using the estimates. There 
is undoubtedly some imprecision created by our procedures.
Findings
Table 2.1 provides summary information on the fraction of families 
in various demographic and income categories that were eligible for 
the EIC in 1988. Overall, we estimate that about one family in nine 
(10.7 percent) received a credit. About one quarter of black families,
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Table 2.1
Proportion of Various Population Subgroups Who Received 
Earned Income Credit in 1988
All
Race
White
Black
Poverty status
Poor
Nonpoor
Family income
< $10,000
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
> $30,000
Marital status
Married
Single parent
Age of household head
<Age 25
25-34
35-44
45-64
Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more
Residence
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Large MSA
Small MSA
Non-MSA
10.7
8.7
24.1
32.0
8.8
27.3
39.1
13.4
3.7
1.0
13.0
52.0
21.4
12.8
11.6
5.6
0
26.6
20.2
18.9
8.1
11.7
11.9
10.5
11.1
8.8
12.3
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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half of single-parent families, and about a third of poor families received 
EIC in 1988. So did nearly 9 percent of nonpoor families.
Younger families and families with one child were also more likely 
to receive EIC. Differences by region and MS A residence were small, 
with families in the Northeast least likely to receive EIC and families 
in non-MSAs more likely to receive EIC.
The proportion of families receiving EIC actually rises from the lowest 
family income bracket (<$10,000) to the second bracket 
($10,000-$15,000), presumably because the first bracket includes a 
substantial number of families who fail to meet the earned income re 
quirement. Among families with income above $15,000, EIC receipt 
falls off sharply; this reflects the income limit for EIC eligibility which 
in 1988 was reached at an adjusted gross income of $18,580. Note, 
though, that some families with substantial incomes qualify for EIC, 
because their adjusted gross income (on which EIC eligibility is based) 
is low. 6
The most important numbers in table 2.1 are those for poor and non- 
poor families. Two-thirds of all poor, nonelderly families in 1988 were 
ineligible for EIC. This should not be surprising: it is a natural conse 
quence of the EIC requirements in conjunction with the work status 
and demographic status of the poverty population. We find that about 
a quarter of all poor, nonelderly families had children, but were in 
eligible for EIC because they had no earned income. 7 About another 
quarter had earned income but no children, and the remainder had neither 
earnings nor children. 8 The restriction of EIC benefits to families with 
children excludes over 40 percent of working poor families.
At the same time, a substantial proportion of nonpoor families received 
EIC in 1988. Again, there is really nothing surprising about this: it 
follows from the relatively low phase-out rate, the fact that credit levels 
are not adjusted by family size, and the occasional large differences 
between family income and income for tax purposes.
These nonpoor EIC recipients fall into two groups. The first group 
has income above the poverty line but under the 1988 EIC income max 
imum of $18,580. Since the poverty threshold for a family of four in 
1988 was just over $12,000, it was possible to earn substantially more 
than the poverty line and still receive a credit. For nonpoor families
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in this group, 28 percent received a credit, just a bit less than for the 
percentage for poor families. The other nonpoor group has adjusted 
gross income under $18,580, but family income above that. Two per 
cent of families with income hi that range were eligible for EIC. It turns 
out that they account for a nontrivial portion of the EIC population. 
Table 2.2 shows the average income of the EIC population in 1988. 
Total family income averaged just under $16,000, adjusted gross in 
come was about $10,000, and earned income just under $9000.
Table 2.2 
Mean Income of EIC Recipient Families, 1988
Total family income $15,079 
Adjusted gross income 10,034 
Earned income 9,810 
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Table 2.3 offers a more detailed look at the composition of the EIC 
population. Column (1) shows the share of EIC recipients belonging 
to various population subgroups, column (2) shows the average credit 
received by each group, and column (3) shows the share of total credits 
received.
The figures in column (1) reveal that EIC recipients are predominantly 
white (70 percent) and nonpoor (72.6 percent). Despite this latter find 
ing, three-quarters of EIC families have incomes less than $15,000 (76 
percent). At the other extreme, about one EIC family in nine has an 
income above $20,000, and some even have incomes above $30,000. 
On the whole, though, it appears that the EIC program is providing 
benefits primarily to moderate income, nonpoor families, precisely the 
group that is often excluded from most income-transfer programs.
A majority of the families have a single parent (about 80 percent of 
them are female-headed) and over 80 percent of the families have only
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Table 2.3
EIC Receipt, Average Credit, and Share of Total Credits 
by Selected Family Characteristics, 1988 °
Share of 
EIC 
population 
(%)
All
Race
White
Black
Poverty status
Poor
Nonpoor, income < $18,580
Nonpoor, income > $18, 580
Family income
< $10,000
$10,000-$15,000
$15,000-$20,000
$20,000-$30,000
> $30,000
Marital status
Married
Single parent
Age of household head
<Age 25
25-34
35-44
45-64
Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more
Residence
Northeast
North Central
South
West
Large MSA
Small MSA
Non-MSA
100.0
70.1
29.9
25.4
62.6
12.0
36.2
40.2
12.8
6.7
4.0
43.5
56.5
18.1
38.0
26.5
17.4
0.0
48.9
33.6
17.5
16.7
30.6
35.1
17.7
17.9
31.5
50.6
Average 
credit
($)
486
478
505
487
506
382
556
476
389
410
396
482
490
528
464
520
445
0
495
472
487
508
493
490
446
461
491
492
Share of 
total credits 
(%)
100.0
69.2
30.8
25.2
64.6
10.3
41.0
38.9
9.2
5.9
3.9
43.0
57.0
19.7
36.3
28.3
15.9
0.0
49.8
32.4
17.2
17.4
31.0
35.4
16.2
17.0
31.8
51.2
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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one or two children. Geographically, the EIC population is predominant 
ly composed of rural families (50 percent) and of families in the South 
(35 percent).
There is relatively little variation in the size of the average credit 
received by each group, so the share of total EIC credits received reflects 
primarily each group's share of the EIC population. Thus, almost 70 
percent of EIC credits go to white families, three-quarters to nonpoor 
families, and over half to families in non-MSAs.
Finally, table 2.3 shows that poor families who were eligible for EIC 
received, on average, a credit of $487 in 1988. Their average poverty 
gap the difference between their total income and the poverty stan 
dard for a family of their size was almost $3,300, so that EIC 
eliminated, on average, only 15 percent of the poverty gap. 9 Since EIC 
benefits are positively related to earned income for much of the income 
range for poor families, it follows that EIC benefits will typically be 
negatively related to the poverty gap the larger the gap, the lower the 
EIC credit. It is clear that at current funding levels, EIC makes a relative 
ly modest contribution to the economic well-being of working poor 
families.
Table 2.4 examines the work hours and wage rates of EIC families. 
It shows clearly that the head of an EIC household 10 is, most often, 
an essentially full-time, year-round worker. Almost 60 percent work 
ed at least 1,500 hours a year and almost a quarter reported that they 
worked more than 2,080 hours 40 hours a week for 52 weeks. Wives 
in EIC families worked considerably less: a bit more than one-third 
did not work at all and, of those who did work, two-thirds worked less 
than 1,500 hours. But family labor supply husbands and wives 
together was substantial by any standard. The average family work 
ed almost 1,900 hours a year, with one-third working more than 2,080 
and one-eighth more than 3,000 hours.
Not surprisingly, given their considerable work hours and their low- 
to-moderate incomes, the wage rates of EIC recipients were relatively 
low. Approximately 40 percent of household heads and 70 percent of 
working wives earned less than $5.00 an hour, while only a quarter 
of the family heads and one-seventh of working wives earned as much 
as $7.00 an hour. Whatever concern there may have been that the low
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Table 2.4 
Work Hours and Wage Rates of EIC Recipients
1988 __________ ___
Share of EIC recipients
Work hours - husband or single parent
Did not work 5.1
1-500 12.5
500-1,500 25.1
1,500-2,080 34.6
> 2,080 22.7
Average3 1,544
Work hours - wife
Did not work 36.6
1-500 14.9
500-1,500 27.4
1,500-2,080 12.6
>2,080 8.3
Average8 715
Work hours - family
1-500 11.9
500-1,500 22.7
1,500-2,080 32.4
2,080-3,000 20.6
>3,000 12.4
Average8 1,879
Wage rate - husband or single parent
Did not work 5.1
<$5.00 41.0
$5.00-$7.00 29.0
>$7.00 24.9
Average $5.89 
Wage rate - wife
Did not work 36.6
<$5.00 43.9
$5.00-$7.00 11.0
>$7.00 8.5
Average $4.31
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
a. Includes zeros.
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earned incomes of EIC recipients reflected relatively low work effort 
rather than low wages is clearly allayed by these figures.
Summary
A number of interesting findings emerge from our profile of the 1988 
EIC population. We find that the EIC program provides benefits to 
roughly one-third of all poor families and one-quarter of all black 
families. The EIC population is, however, predominantly white and non- 
poor. The typical EIC family has a low-to-moderate income that places 
it above the poverty line, and for many of these families, the EIC credit 
may well be the only income assistance they receive. We also find that 
the EIC population appears to be working relatively long hours at low 
wages. Finally, the average credits were quite low, so the contribution 
of the EIC program to the economic well-being of low- and moderate- 
income families is certainly quite modest.
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NOTES
1. In 1988, the maximum credit was $875. The maximum earnings on which the credit could 
be received was $6,250 and the stationary range extended to $9,830. The credit was completely 
phased out at an adjusted gross income of $18,580. The phase-in and phase-out rates were 14 
and 10 percent, exactly as in 1990.
2. The PSID data have been collected annually since 1968 by the University of Michigan's In 
stitute for Social Research and have been used in countless research studies of economic well- 
being. Because the PSID oversamples poor families, it provides a larger-than-normal proportion 
of EIC-eligible families. The use of sample weights corrects for this oversampling and yields 
a representative national sample of the population and of EIC recipients.
3. There is no nationally representative data set that provides both specific information on EIC 
receipt and on characteristics of families that receive EIC.
4. We necessarily assume that every eligible family actually receives EIC. The IRS now checks 
all returns for EIC eligibility and computes the credit it if is not already claimed. The procedure 
we use will overstate receipt if some eligible families do not file tax returns.
5. It is impossible to be definitive here, since no data set containing 1988 information is currently 
available. CPS information for 1988 was collected in the spring of 1989 and will not be available 
before mid-1990.
6. The high income of some EIC-eligible families appears to reflect two general situations: 
(1) substantial income provided by "other family members" who may actually be filing a separate 
tax return; and (2) substantial nontaxable transfer income. This finding also appears in the IRS 
reports; see Committee on Ways and Means 1989, p. 795.
7. More accurately, there had no earned income in 1984. Since we had no information about 
actual employment in 1988, we assumed that individuals did not change their work status be 
tween 1984 and 1988.
8. Prior to the 1987 EIC adjustments, it was also possible for a family to be officially poor but 
to have an income above the maximum EIC income level and thus be income-ineligible.
9. The comparable figure from the CPS for 1986 is $4,394 for all poor families and $4,766 for 
poor families with children. The PSID typically finds higher reported incomes and thus lower 
poverty rates and poverty gaps than the CPS.
10. The PSID defines the husband as the head of a married household except in rare circumstances.

3
The Labor Supply Effects 
of the EIC
In this chapter, we examine the likely effects of the EIC on the labor 
supply (hours of work) of EIC recipients. Labor supply effects are not 
only of importance in then- own right a program that reduces self- 
reliance is clearly a matter of concern but also for accurately predict 
ing program costs. 1
That income-transfer programs might affect individual decisions about 
how much to work is by now well-understood. The adverse labor supply 
effects of the AFDC program and of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) 
have been widely studied and are regarded as among the more serious 
defects of those programs.
That EIC might also have adverse labor supply effects has not been 
as fully appreciated. But since EIC changes both an individual's net 
wage and his or her total income, it, too, provides a possible incentive 
for an individual to change the number of hours worked.
There are, though, some important and interesting differences be 
tween the likely labor supply effects of EIC and those of more conven 
tional income transfer programs like AFDC and NIT. First, it is quite 
possible that EIC could increase the labor supply of workers in low- 
income families, something that can be said for none of the other ma 
jor income-transfer programs. And second, while EIC does have some 
potential negative labor supply effects, they are primarily confined to 
workers in nonpoor families whose labor supply is already substantial. 
That, too, would seem to be an attractive difference between EIC and 
other income-transfer programs.
We estimate that in 1988 the EIC program reduced the annual hours 
EIC recipients worked by at most 2 or 3 percent. The small size of 
this effect is largely the result of the relatively modest income amounts 
currently offered by the program. Increases in the generosity of the pro 
gram, coupled with increases in the phase-out range, would almost cer 
tainly lead to larger reductions in labor supply.
37
38 Labor Supply Effects
The Effect of EIC on Individual Labor Supply
We begin with a nontechnical discussion of the standard economic 
theory of individual labor supply in order to set the stage for evaluating 
the impact of EIC. 2 Readers familiar with the theory will want to skip 
ahead to the next section. We then turn to the details of the EIC pro 
gram and look at its expected labor supply effects. Finally, we use the 
labor supply results from the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex 
periments (SIME/DIME) to estimate the likely effect of the EIC pro 
gram on labor supply in 1988. In chapter 5, we apply the same pro 
cedure to a set of alternative EIC plans.
The Economic Theory of Individual Labor Supply
According to the standard economic theory of individual labor sup 
ply, each individual chooses the amount of hours he or she wants to 
work on the basis of three general considerations: (1) the net wage rate, 
which is the amount by which take-home pay would increase with another 
hour of work; (2) the amount of nonlabor income; and (3) preferences 
for work vs. income. Together, these three factors lead to a "best" 
number of hours of work, where "best" means that the value of the 
income gained from an additional hour of work just offsets the value 
of the leisure that is given up in working that extra hour. No other choice 
would be preferred.
For our purposes here, the exact details of this choice are unimpor 
tant. What does matter is how this choice is likely to change when there 
is a change in the net wage and/or in nonlabor income. That is where 
EIC fits in, since, like all income-transfer programs, it does exactly 
that it changes an individual's net wage and her nonlabor income.
Before turning to the specifics of EIC and the changes it causes, we 
need to develop the general principles. Suppose, first, that an individual's 
unearned income increases, but the net wage is unchanged. At the in 
dividual's current hours of work, total income (earned plus unearned) 
is now obviously higher than before. Both common sense and numerous 
research studies suggest that, in the event of a change of this kind, an 
individual will typically work a bit less than before. 3 More formally, 
economists say that the income effect on labor supply is negative: as
Labor Supply Effects 39
unearned income goes up, the amount of hours that an individual will 
choose to work goes down.
The effect on desired hours of work of an increase in the net wage 
is more complicated because two things change simultaneously. First, 
the higher net wage means that an individual can now get more income 
per hour of leisure given up. If all other things including income  
 were unchanged, it would make sense to work a bit more. Intuitive 
ly, the "price" of leisure measured by the wage rate is higher, and 
an individual would tend to "buy" less of it, which, in turn, is equivalent 
to working more. This effect captures the pure price effect of a wage 
change. It is called the substitution effect, and it causes a change in work 
hours that is in the same direction as the change in the wage rate. 4
But other things are not equal, since the wage increase also makes 
an individual richer at the current hours of work. For example, a $.50 
per hour wage increase for an individual working 40 hours a week makes 
that person exactly $20 richer, prior to any changes in labor supply. 
This change in income is the second effect and, exactly as in the case 
of an increase in unearned income, it will typically cause a decrease 
hi work hours.
Note that in the case of an increase in the wage rate, the substitution 
and income effects naturally conflict. The higher wage is an incentive 
to work more, while the higher income is an incentive to work less. 
Whether an individual will work more or less when the wage increases 
depends on whether the substitution effect is greater than or less than 
the income effect.
This simple analysis is all we need to make predictions about how 
changes in the net wage and/or unearned income like those caused 
by the EIC program will affect an individual's labor supply choice. 
There are two simple "rules":
(1) An increase (decrease) in income with no change in the net 
wage will decrease (increase) desired labor supply. This is the in 
come effect.
(2) An increase (decrease) in the net wage rate with no change 
in income (measured at the original work hours) will increase 
(decrease) desired labor supply. This is the substitution effect.
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In order to determine the likely labor supply effects of any change, 
simply see which of the above conditions apply and draw the appropriate 
conclusion. When these changes happen in isolation, we can always 
make a definite prediction. When two changes happen simultaneously, 
the result may sometimes be indeterminate, as in the case of an increase 
in the wage rate that both increases the net wage and total income. But, 
as we will see below in the analysis of the phase-out range of the EIC, 
sometimes even when there are simultaneous changes, we can still be 
certain of the likely result.
EIC and Labor Supply
We expect EIC to affect individual labor supply choices because it 
alters the net wage rate an individual receives as well as his or her total 
income. The three ranges of the EIC phase-in, stationary, and phase- 
out have quite different labor supply effects, though, because the 
changes in the net wage and in nonlabor income caused by EIC are 
quite different in each range.
Consider, first, a low-wage worker whose household earnings before 
any credit place him in the EIC phase-in range (earnings less than $6,250 
in 1988). With the EIC, two things happen: first, his net wage is in 
creased by 14 percent (the EIC phase-in rate) and, second, at his cur 
rent hours of work, his income is exactly 14 percent higher than before. 
For example, someone who was earning $4.25 an hour and working 
1,250 hours a year without EIC, has, with EIC, a net wage of 
$4.85 $4.25 plus a $.60 per hour credit and is $750 richer. 5
Exactly like the case of an increase in the net wage, the effect of these 
changes on an individual's labor supply is uncertain. The substitution 
effect of the higher net wage provides an incentive to work more hours, 
but the income effect of more income at the current hours of work pro 
vides the opposite incentive. The incentives conflict, and on the basis 
of theory alone we cannot be certain which is stronger. Thus, for workers 
on the EIC phase-in range, EIC may increase or decrease labor sup 
ply. Although noneconomists often assume that a wage subsidy like EIC 
will always provide an incentive to work more, in fact, that is not 
necessarily so. There is no guarantee that labor supply will not decrease.
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For an individual whose pre-EIC income puts her in the stationary 
range (income between $6,250 and $9,830 in 1988), the expected labor 
supply effect of EIC is unambiguous. She would receive a credit of 
$875 and, thus, be exactly $875 richer. But her net wage is unchang 
ed, since another hour of work does not affect the credit she receives 
(unless she is earning exactly $9,830). For her, the EIC operates as 
a pure increase in income it is like an increase in unearned income 
even though it is related to her work. 6 Thus, in this range, EIC pro 
vides an incentive to reduce labor supply via an income effect.
In the phase-out range (income between $9,830 and $18,580 in 1988), 
the labor supply prediction is also clear. Here, a worker has a lower 
net wage rate than in the absence of EIC, because of the 10 percent 
phase-out of the credit. For example, if an individual's net wage without 
EIC was $5.50, the net wage with EIC would be only $4.95 that is, 
$5.50 - .10 * $5.50 because the credit is reduced by 10 percent for 
each additional dollar earned. But despite this cut in the net wage, the 
individual is nevertheless richer because of the income received from 
the credit. Thus, on the phase-out range, an individual is simultaneously 
richer than without EIC and has a lower net wage rate. Both changes 
provide incentives to reduce labor supply.
This last result should not be a surprise to those familiar with the 
operation of means-tested income support programs it is the standard 
result for a program that provides benefits to lower-income workers 
and then withdraws the benefits as earnings increase. The benefits make 
the individual richer, while the phase-out reduces the net wage. The 
simultaneous increase in income and cut in the net wage assures a reduc 
tion in labor supply. AFDC and NIT are the classic examples, and, 
indeed, the NIT experiments were conducted to provide information 
about how large the labor supply reductions might be.
There are several important differences, though, between the labor 
supply disincentives of EIC and of a traditional welfare program like 
AFDC. First, since the phase-out range in AFDC begins almost with 
the first hours of work there is a small "earnings disregard" of $30 
per month and an allowance for child care expenses the work disincen 
tives are concentrated on low-income workers. In contrast, in the EIC 
program, the phase-out range affects workers with much higher incomes 
and thus much higher pre-EIC work hours.
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Second, the income increase and the phase-out rate in EIC are both 
very low, at least by the standards of other transfer programs. The cur 
rent statutory phase-out rate in AFDC is 66 percent (after the $30 a 
month "disregard") for the first four months of work, and 100 percent 
thereafter. Average annual AFDC benefits per family in 1988 were 
$4,400 (Committee on Ways and Means 1989, table 19, p. 557) com 
pared to less than $500 per family under EIC. Because of this, the labor 
supply effects of EIC will be much less serious than for more conven 
tional income-transfer programs.
There is one final group of "workers" for whom the labor supply 
incentives of EIC are uniformly positive. They are easily overlooked, 
but they may well be important. They are workers who are not work 
ing in the absence of EIC. The most likely such group is women receiving 
AFDC, and for them, EIC is simply a wage increase, with no offset 
ting increase in income. 7 The labor supply effects for this group are 
unambiguously positive.
Summarizing:
(1) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the 
EIC phase-in range, the effects of EIC on hours of work are uncer 
tain. Desired hours of work may increase or decrease.
(2) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the 
EIC stationary range, EIC reduces hours of work due to the in 
come effect.
(3) For a worker in a household with income that places it on the 
EIC phase-out range, EIC reduces hours of work due to both the 
substitution effect and the income effect.
(4) For an individual in a household with no earned income in 
the absence of EIC, EIC should increase the probability of work.
Evaluating Changes in EIC
Using exactly the same labor supply analysis as above, we can predict 
the likely labor supply effects of changes in the EIC program. To assess 
any proposed change, simply check whether it would increase or decrease 
an individual's net wage and whether it would increase or decrease her 
income (measured at her current labor supply).
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To pick a very simple example, suppose the phase-in and phase- out 
rates were both increased, but the income levels defining the phase-in, 
stationary, and phase-out ranges were kept constant. What would we 
expect to happen? For a worker on the phase-in range, the net wage 
is now higher, but so is income at the current labor supply, so labor 
supply could increase or decrease. On the stationary range, labor supply 
will definitely fall, since the credit is now larger and the net wage is 
unchanged. Finally, for a worker on the phase-out range, the credit is 
larger and the net wage lower, leading to a further reduction in labor 
supply.
Some effects, though, are more complex because they result in changes 
in the size of the population eligible for EIC. Suppose, as an example 
of this, that the phase-out rate was reduced but everything else remain 
ed the same. For workers on the phase-in and stationary ranges, 
everything is exactly as before so there would be no changes in labor 
supply. For workers on the phase-out range, there are conflicting ef 
fects. The lower phase-out rate increases their net wage and thus pro 
vides a labor supply incentive via the substitution effect. But, at the 
same time, they will receive a larger credit than before the credit is 
now phased-out more slowly and that generates an income effect that 
will reduce desired work. Finally, because the lower phase-out rate raises 
the maximum income level at which the credit is received, previously 
ineligible higher-income families are now eligible for EIC on the phase- 
out range. For these new eligibles, there is both a substitution effect, 
since the phase-out rate lowers the net wage, and an income effect, since 
they now receive a credit; both changes are incentives to reduce hours 
worked. Whether the total labor supply effects of this kind of change 
are positive or negative depends on the magnitude of the changes for 
the current eligibles on the phase-out range and for the new eligibles.
The Labor Supply Effects of the EIC in 1988
The theoretical predictions about the labor supply effects of EIC tell 
us, at most, only about its qualitative effects  whether labor supply 
is expected to increase or decrease. It does not, however, predict whether 
those effects are likely to be large or small. In the case of the phase-in 
range, where the two labor supply effects conflict, the theory does not
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even yield qualitative predictions. For information on the actual quan 
titative effects of EIC, we need to turn to empirical studies of individual 
labor supply responses to programs like EIC.
To do that, we use information on income and substitution effects 
estimated for low-income workers in the Seattle/Denver Income 
Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). We then apply those estimates 
to the 1984 PSID data, updated to 1988 values as described in chapter 
2. The SIME/DIME research provides estimates of the labor supply 
response of husbands, wives, and female heads per dollar of wage change 
(the substitution effect) and per $1000 of income change (the income 
effect). 8 For each working individual in a PSID family receiving an 
EIC credit in 1988, we first calculate the change in their net wage 
(relative to no EIC) and the amount of the credit they would receive, 
and then use those estimates to compute an expected change in labor 
supply. 9
It is important to understand that we are not independently testing 
whether EIC causes changes in labor supply. That would be a rather 
formidable task that is beyond the scope of this monograph. Rather, 
we are assuming that the EIC recipient population reacts to the program- 
induced changes in the net wage and income in the same way that 
SIME/DIME participants reacted to the changes caused by the Negative 
Income Tax. Given the rather indirect link between hours of work, earn 
ed income, and receipt of the credit via the annual tax filing, it is cer 
tainly possible that workers might ignore the EIC effects altogether or 
perhaps regard the credit solely as an increase in income. Nevertheless, 
we think that treating workers as well-informed and as making pur 
poseful decisions about labor supply is useful. It is probably prudent, 
though, to think of the estimates below as likely maximum responses 
to the current EIC program.
Our estimates are presented in table 3.1, separately for workers in 
each of the three EIC ranges, by wage level, and for husbands, wives, 
and single heads. 10 The table shows that the labor supply response is 
almost certainly quite small at current EIC program values. Averaging 
over all groups and ranges, we estimate that in 1988 the EIC program 
reduced labor supply of EIC recipients by just over 30 hours a year, 
or just over 2 percent of what labor supply would have been in the 
absence of an EIC program.
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Table 3.1 
Estimated Labor Supply Response to EIC Program, 1988
Change in annual Percentage 
work hours change
All recipients
EIC range 
Phase-in
Stationary 
Phase-out
Wage rate 
<$5.00
$5.00 - $7.00
>$7.00
Marital status
Husbands
Wives
Single parents
-31.2
18.4
-35.1 
-51.1
-17.6
 -36.7
-52.7
-30.4
-41.6
-26.9
-2.1
2.2
-2.3 
-2.8
-1.1
-2.2
-3.6
-1.6
-3.6
-1.9
Proportion of 
EIC recipients
100
25.2
14.6 
60.2
48.5
27.9
23.6
31.5
21.9
46.6
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Interestingly, for workers on the phase-in range, the estimated labor 
supply change is positive. We estimate that annual hours of work in 
crease by 18 hours or roughly half a week's work. While this is not 
a large change, it is a very encouraging result and one that was uncer 
tain a priori. It may well be the first evidence of an income transfer 
program with any positive labor supply effects.
Because of the labor supply effect, these workers are actually earn 
ing more than they would have in the absence of the program  total 
earnings increase by more than the credit since labor supply increases. 
Since the average wage for these workers is about $4.00 per hour and 
their average credit is $390, the estimated labor supply increase means 
that the each dollar of credit received by these workers translates into 
a $1.18 increase in total income. 11
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For workers on the stationary and phase-out range, the estimated labor 
supply effects are negative, as expected. The largest negative effects 
are for workers on the phase-out range, because both substitution and 
income effects cause a decrease in hours and also because the absolute 
change in the wage (which determines the magnitude of the substitu 
tion effect) is usually large. Using the average wages and credit for 
these two groups of workers, the labor supply responses offset approx 
imately 20 percent of the credit for workers on the stationary range and 
70 percent of the credit for workers on the phase-out range. 12
When we look at workers grouped according to their wage rates a 
classification that might approximate a labor market we find that 
predicted hours worked fall for all three wage groups. There is a decline 
even for low-wage workers, because a majority of low-wage workers 
are not in low-income families (i.e., phase-in level incomes). (See table 
3.2 for details on the distribution of workers by wage bracket across 
the three EIC ranges.) The predicted decline in work hours in about 
1 percent for the lowest wage group, 2 percent for workers earning 
between $5 and $7 per hour, and over 3.5 percent for the highest-wage 
group.
Table 3.2
The Distribution of Workers in EIC-Eligible Families 
by Wage Rate and EIC Range, 1988
Wage level Phase-in Stationary Phase-out
<$5.00
$5.00 - $7.00
>$7.00
40.2
14.1
7.9
16.8
13.4
11.4
43.1
72.5
80.7
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Finally, the bottom portion of the table shows the predicted changes 
for husbands, wives, and single parents. In both absolute and percent-
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age terms, the labor supply decline is largest for wives. This occurs 
both because working wives tend to be in families with income that 
puts them on the phase-out range and also because the SIME/DIME 
research found that they were most responsive to changes in the net 
wage and income.
What do these labor supply changes tell us? First, because EIC in 
corporates subsidy and taxation rates that are quite modest relative to 
AFDC or the NIT plans, its labor supply effects are small. The 2 per 
cent labor supply response we found here is less than one-quarter of 
that found for the various NIT plans tested in the SIME/DIME research. 
More generous EIC plans with larger subsidy and taxation rates would 
be likely to have proportionately larger effects. 13
Second, on both the phase-in and phase-out ranges, the labor supply 
response will increase the amount of credit for which a family is eligi 
ble. For workers on the phase-in range, the average 18-hour increase 
in labor supply would increase the credit received by about $10 (2 per 
cent), while the labor supply response of workers on the phase-out range 
would increase their credit by about $30 (about 7 percent). 14
Summary
Means-tested income-transfer programs inevitably offer incentives 
for individuals to reduce their work hours, and EIC is no exception. 
We estimate that in 1988, the EIC program reduced the annual labor 
supply of recipients by about 30 hours, just over 2 percent.
There are, however, two features of EIC that are unique and very 
attractive. Its most adverse labor supply incentives are concentrated not, 
as in most income-transfer programs, on workers with the weakest con 
nection to the labor market, but on workers whose income and labor 
supply is substantial. Second, for workers in the poorest EIC families  
those on the phase-in range the labor supply incentives are mixed, rather 
than unambiguously negative. While it is not inevitable that an EIC- 
style wage subsidy will increase labor supply for workers on the phase-in 
range, our empirical estimates suggest that this is, in fact, likely to be 
the result.
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
The Labor Supply Effects of the EIC Program
Figure 3A. 1 shows a standard diagram for individual labor supply analysis. 
Hours of work are measured along the horizontal axis and total income on 
the vertical axis. Since the diagram measures work hours, rather than leisure 
time, along the axis, the corresponding indifference curves are upward-sloping. 
For simplicity, we ignore the effect of taxes and other welfare programs on 
budget lines. We also assume that EIC does not result in any change in market 
wage rates.
Figure 3A. 1 illustrates the effect of EIC on labor supply for a worker whose 
adjusted gross income in 1988 was under $6,250 and who was, therefore, on 
the phase-in range of the EIC. In the absence of EIC, the relevant budget line 
is OB0 ; the slope of OB0 is w, the market wage. Optimal labor supply is HQ, 
where the indifference curve and budget line are tangent.
Figure 3A.I
Labor Supply Effects of EIC 
for a Worker on EIC Phase-In Range
Income
B, (slope = 1.14 w) 
B'
B 0 (slope = w)
HO Hours of Work
H
NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OB, is budget constraint with EIC. 
Substitution Effect: HO -*-H'; Income Effect: H' -*-H,; Total Effect: H0 -*-H,
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Figure 3A.2 
Labor Supply Effects of EIC for a Worker on EIC Stationary Range
Income
BQ (slope = w)
0 Hours of Work
NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OCBj is budget constraint with EIC. 
Income Effect = Total Effect =H0 -*-Hj
Figure 3A.3 
Labor Supply Effects of EIC for a Worker on EIC Phase-Out Range
Income
Phase-out
(slope = 0.9 w) B i
BQ (slope = w)
Hours of WorkH'
NOTE: OBQ is budget constraint without EIC. OCDBj is budget constraint with EIC. 
Substitution Effect: H,, -*-H'; Income Effect: H' -»  H,; Total Effect: HQ -*>H,
50 Labor Supply Effects
In the phase-in range, EIC operates exactly like a conventional 14 percent 
wage increase. Thus, the ElC-inclusive budget line pivots upward to OBj, 
whose slope is 1.14*w. Using the Slutsky decomposition, the substitution ef 
fect is measured along budget line OB7 , which incorporates the wage subsidy 
(it is parallel to OBj), but, for labor supply HQ, yields the original income. 
Faced with a higher net wage and the same total income (at HQ), an individual 
will typically choose to increase labor supply. In the figure, desired labor supply 
increases to H7 . This increase from HQ to H7 reflects the substitution effect.
The income effect of the change in the net wage is measured across parallel 
budget lines, from OB7 to OBj. The vertical distance between the two budget 
lines is precisely the amount of the credit for which the individual is eligible 
at current work hours (.14*wH0 in this example). Assuming that leisure is 
a normal good, hours of work fall, so that the optimal hours choice along OBj 
will lie to the left of H7 (i.e., fewer hours of work). As always, the income 
and substitution effects of a wage increase conflict and hours worked may rise 
or fall.
Whether or not the choice of desked work hours with EIC involves a decrease 
or increase relative to HQ is an empirical issue. Figure 3A. 1 illustrates the 
case where the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, so that 
the EIC wage subsidy increases work hours.
Figure 3A. 2 provides the corresponding analysis for a worker with family 
income between $6,250 and $9,830. The pre-EIC budget line is again denoted 
as OB0 and the original hours choice is HQ. With EIC, this worker faces the 
kinked budget line OCBp The important point is that, in the neighborhood 
of current labor supply, the net wage is unchanged (OB0 and OCBj both have 
a slope of w), but total income is exactly $875 higher. The expected result 
is a decline in labor supply from HQ to Hj.
Finally, the case of a worker on the EIC phase-out range is shown in figure 
3A.3. The two budget lines are OB0 and OCDBj, and this time, in the rele 
vant range, the EIC-inclusive budget line is both higher and flatter. The substitu 
tion effect, measured along B7 , causes a reduction in labor supply to H7 . Here, 
unlike the case of a worker on the phase-in range, the income effect also causes 
a reduction in labor supply. Labor supply, under EIC, is shown as Hj.
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NOTES
1. In the EIC program, most of the likely changes in labor supply increase the amount of credit 
that an individual is eligible to receive and thus increase the cost of the program.
2. A more technical analysis is given in the appendix to this chapter.
3. Intuitively, the individual "spends" some of the increase in total income on more leisure. Taking 
more leisure is equivalent to working fewer hours.
4. The substitution effect is measured under the hypothetical situation in which the wage changes 
and there is at the same time a perfectly offsetting change in nonlabor income, leaving the in 
dividual neither richer nor poorer at the current hours worked.
5. $.60 is 14 percent of $4.25. $750 equals $.60 per hour times 1,250 hours.
6. It is, however, unrelated to her hours of work at her current hours of work.
7. Technically, they are no richer at their current labor supply choice of hours.
8. We use Robins' (1985) summary of estimated income and substitution effect parameters for 
the SIME/DIME research. The substitution effects, measured as the expected change in annual 
work hours per dollar change in the wage, are -47, -85, and -75 for husbands, wives, and female 
heads, respectively. The corresponding income effects, per $1,000 increase in income, are -36, 
-47, and -50.
9. Our estimate is AHi =bs*AWi +bj*AIi, where i indexes individuals, b$and bj are the 
SIME/DIME estimated substitution and income effect parameters, respectively, AH is the predicted 
change in annual hours worked, AW is the change in the net wage due to EIC, and AI is the 
change in income at current labor supply and is equal to the credit received. Our approach is 
partial-equilibrium; we assume that the program does not change market wages. Given the cur 
rent operation of the program, this is probably a reasonable assumption, but if EIC were substan 
tially expanded, one might expect the labor supply effects to be large enough to change market 
wage rates.
10. For the small number of single men heading EIC families, we used the SIME/DIME labor 
supply response estimates for single female heads.
11. The 1.18 figure is the increase in credit plus earned income ($72) divided by the credit alone.
12. The average wages for the two groups are $5.00 and $6.00, respectively. Average credits 
are $874 for the stationary-range workers and $430 for those in the phase-out range.
13. See chapter 5 for further details.
14. For workers on the phase-in range, $10 is 14 percent of the additional $72 of earned income 
(18 hours x $4.00/hour). For workers on the phase-out range, $30 is 10 percent of the predicted 
$300 decrease in earnings (51 hours x $6.00/hour).

4
Comparisons with Other 
Antipoverty Policies
This chapter compares the Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) with four 
antipoverty policies: a negative income tax, welfare (Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children), an increase in the minimum wage, and a 
wage subsidy.
Negative Income Tax
More than two decades ago, it was proposed that the tax system be 
used to provide cash benefits to low-income households. Instead of mak 
ing a net payment to the Internal Revenue Service, a low-income 
household would receive a net payment from the IRS. The proposal 
was called a Negative Income Tax (NIT) because the household would 
receive cash from, rather than pay cash to, the IRS; and the amount 
would depend on its income. But an EIC also uses the tax system to 
make cash payments to low-income households. So how does an EIC 
differ from an NIT?
There are two crucial differences between the EIC schedule and the 
NIT schedule. Recall from chapter 1 the two distinguishing features 
of an EIC, illustrated here in figure 4.1. First, if a household has no 
earnings, it receives no credit, so the EIC is clearly restricted to work 
ing households. Second, the EIC begins with a phase-in range where 
the credit rises as the household's labor earnings rise.
As can be seen in figure 4.2, the NIT differs from the EIC in these 
two crucial features. If a household has no earnings, it receives the max 
imum credit Cm, so the NIT gives its largest credit to nonworking 
households. Hence, the NIT does not have a phase-in range. It may 
begin with a stationary range, as drawn in figure 4.2, or may simply 
begin with its phase-out range. Most proposed NIT plans have a small 
stationary range to cover work- related expenses.
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Figure 4.1 
EIC Schedule
Figure 4.2 
NIT Schedule
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There is a simple relationship between the EIC diagram (figure 4.1) 
and the NIT diagram (figure 4.2). In figure 4.1, imagine moving the 
vertical axis to the right so it goes through point Em (so Em =0) and 
then erasing everything to the left of Em . The result would be figure 
4.2, the NIT diagram. So the NIT is an EIC that omits the phase-in 
range. 1
What would be the impact of an NIT on labor supply? The answer 
was given in chapter 3 where we analyzed the impact of an EIC on 
labor supply; just skip the section on the phase-in range. Just as an EIC 
should reduce labor supply for households in the stationary or phase- 
out ranges, so would an NIT.
Welfare
Both an EIC and an NIT use the tax system to assist low-income 
households. Welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children AFDC) 
does not use the tax system. Yet welfare is similar to the NIT, and dif 
fers from the EIC, in the key feature of its schedule: the maximum benefit 
goes to the household with zero earnings, so there is no phase-in range. 
This feature largely reflects the historical origins of AFDC, which was 
included in the original Social Security Act as a way to provide assistance 
primarily to young widows and their children in a time when labor force 
participation of women with young children was not expected.
Since welfare and an NIT share this fundamental feature, how do 
they differ? First, an NIT would apply to all households with income 
below the designated standard. By contrast, AFDC largely confines 
assistance to single parents with children. 2 An NIT would therefore 
remove the incentive to become or remain a single parent in order to 
obtain benefits. Second, an NIT would provide cash only, and would 
neither impose work requirements nor offer social work services.
Whether an NIT is preferable to welfare can be debated. For our pur 
pose, the key point is not the difference between an NIT and welfare, 
but the key property they share in contrast to the EIC: the NIT and 
welfare provide the maximum benefit to the household with zero earn 
ings, while the EIC provides zero benefit; the NIT and welfare lack 
a phase-in range, a key feature of the EIC.
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Minimum Wage Law
The minimum wage has two serious shortcomings in comparison with 
an EIC. First, raising the minimum wage reduces employment and 
generates involuntary unemployment. Second, many of the beneficiaries 
of minimum wage legislation live in relatively affluent households.
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of a minimum wage law. The legal 
minimum wage w* exceeds the market wage w0 determined by sup 
ply and demand. The rise in the wage to w* reduces the total hours 
of labor that firms find profitable, so total hours are reduced from H0 
to H*. Workers whose hours are not reduced gain from the minimum 
wage law. Workers who remain employed but have hours reduced may 
gain or lose. Workers who are laid off or never find a job in the first 
place clearly lose.
Figure 4.3 
Minimum Wage Impact
H (Hours)
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By contrast, as we explained in chapter 3, an EIC may raise or lower 
labor supply (depending on whether the phase-in or phase-out ranges 
dominate), but at the market wage that results, labor demand equals 
labor supply, so the EIC does not generate involuntary unemployment.
Many of the workers who benefit from raising the minimum wage 
are relatively affluent. One recent study (Burkhauser and Finegan 1989), 
using data from the Current Population Survey, estimated that if the 
minimum wage were raised from $3.35 to $5.05, only about 10 per 
cent of the increased wage bill would go to low-wage workers who live 
in households below the poverty line, while nearly 40 percent would 
go to low-wage workers whose household income was at least three 
times the poverty line. Previous research (Gramlich 1976; Johnson and 
Browning 1983) also provides evidence of the weak relationship be 
tween low-wage workers and low-income families.
The minimum wage law, however, has two political advantages over 
the EIC. First, the EIC has a visible budgetary cost, while the minimum 
wage does not. Second, the EIC reduces the cost of low-skilled workers 
to firms, while the minimum wage raises the cost. High-wage firms 
that compete with low-wage firms prefer the minimum wage to EIC 
because it reduces competition from low-wage firms.
It should be recognized, however, that the minimum wage imposes 
both an invisible budgetary cost and a genuine loss on the economy. 
Workers who are laid off because of the minimum wage may qualify 
for unemployment compensation. Workers who simply do not find a 
job may qualify for welfare. Yet the public may not recognize that these 
budgetary costs are due to the minimum wage.
More important, the output of the economy is reduced by the minimum 
wage. Output varies directly with hours of labor. Since the minimum 
wage reduces total hours of work, it reduces national output. Moreover, 
the reduction in hours is involuntary. At the minimum wage w* in figure 
4.3, workers want to supply more hours than firms demand. So the 
workers whose hours are reduced, or who are laid off, clearly do not 
prefer the enforced "leisure" to the lost income. Thus, the minimum 
wage imposes a genuine loss on the economy.
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Wage Subsidy
A wage subsidy (WS) would pay an individual a fraction of the gap 
between his wage and some target wage. For example, an individual 
might receive a credit equal to 50 percent of the gap between his wage 
and $7. 3 The larger the gap (the lower the individual's wage), the larger 
would be the wage subsidy. If the individual's wage were $4, his credit 
per hour would be $1.50 (50 percent of the $3 gap); if his wage were 
$5, his credit per hour would be $1.00 (50 percent of the $2 gap).
A central distinction between a wage subsidy and the earned income 
credit is that a WS is based on the individual's wage, while the EIC 
is based on the household's total income. If the WS applied to all low- 
wage individuals, it would be subject to the same criticism as the 
minimum wage law: its benefits would be poorly targeted. As we just 
documented in our discussion of the minimum wage law, there is only 
a weak relationship between low-wage workers and low-income families.
This targeting problem can be significantly reduced by placing eligibili 
ty restrictions on the WS. For example, one advocate has suggested 
that the subsidy be limited to the principal earner in a household (the 
individual who earned the most money during the previous calender 
quarter) with dependent children. 4 This would prevent subsidy from 
going to nonpoor teenagers, or second earners whose primary earner 
has a high wage.
Nevertheless, under a wage subsidy, households with very different 
incomes might receive the same benefits. For example, suppose that 
the principal earner in households A and B each earn $5 per hour, but 
household A has a second earner who also earns $5 per hour, while 
household B does not. Household A has twice the income of household 
B, yet would receive the same total wage subsidy. Moreover, the wage 
subsidy would remain equal even if household A also had significant 
property income while B has none.
It would be possible, of course, to introduce further restrictions bas 
ed on household income into the wage subsidy program. For example, 
limits on household property income might be imposed. But the result 
would be a hybrid subsidy, based partly on the individual's wage and
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partly on the household's total income, that might be difficult to under 
stand and still be beset with unintended anomalies.
The advantage of the EIC is that it is based on household total in 
come. Simply and automatically, the EIC takes account of multiple 
earners and income sources.
Besides targeting, there are two other key differences between a WS 
and an EIC. First, the WS credit depends exclusively on the wage rate, 
while the EIC credit depends on total earnings which are the product 
of the wage and the number of hours worked. Second, the WS phases 
out over its entire range; whenever the wage increases towards $7, the 
credit per hour is cut. By contrast, the EIC begins with a phase-in range, 
and may have a stationary range before its phase-out begins. What are 
the consequences of these two differences?
In our analysis of the EIC, we saw that a phase-out imposes a positive 
marginal tax rate (MTR). For example, the current EIC phase-out rate 
of 10 percent imposes an MTR of 10 percent because an additional $100 
of earnings results in a net gain of only $90 (since the credit is cut $10). 
Hence, earning more by either raising hours worked or obtaining a 
higher wage is discouraged in the EIC phase-out range.
The reverse occurs in the EIC phase-in range. We saw that the phase-in 
imposes a "negative" MTR. For example, the current EIC phase-in 
rate of 14 percent imposes an MTR of -14 percent because an addi 
tional $100 of earnings results in a net gain of $114. Hence, earning 
more by either raising hours worked or obtaining a higher wage is 
encouraged in the EIC phase-in range.
Under a WS, the credit depends on the wage, not hours worked. So 
working more hours never provokes a phase-out, and is never discourag 
ed. On the other hand, since the WS phases out over its entire range, 
working harder or better in order to earn a higher wage is always 
discouraged. In the above example, suppose a worker earns a wage in 
crease from $4 to $5 per hour. His net gain per hour is only $.50, not 
$1, because his credit per hour is cut from $1.50 to $1. His income 
per hour (wage plus credit) rises only from $5.50 to $6. Thus, this par 
ticular wage subsidy imposes a 50 percent MTR on wage increases.
Thus, a WS never discourages more hours of work, while an EIC 
discourages more hours in its phase-out range. But a WS always
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discourages effort to earn a higher wage, while an EIC encourages such 
effort in its phase-in range.
Finally, there is a serious practical problem with the wage subsidy: 
measuring work hours accurately. Suppose an employer and employee 
agree on annual compensation of $10,000. Although the employee is 
actually required to work 2,000 hours, implying a wage of $5, the 
employer and employee agree to report a wage of $4 and hours of 2,500. 
Under the above WS example, a wage of $4 would obtain a WS credit 
per hour of $1.50; multiplied by 2,500 hours, the annual credit would 
be $3,750. If they had reported a wage of $5, the credit per hour would 
have been only $1; multiplied by 2,000 hours, the annual credit would 
have been only $2,000. Thus, by understating the wage and overstating 
hours worked, the employee gains $1,750 of annual credit while the 
employer's compensation remains $10,000.
Because it would be difficult for auditors to determine actual hours 
worked, especially in small firms, many employers and employees might 
be tempted to engage in such distortion. Monitoring wages and hours 
is more difficult than monitoring their product earnings.
NOTES
1. The algebra of the NIT schedule is the same as the algebra of the EIC schedule (given in the 
appendix to chapter 1) with the phase-in omitted:
C=C^
C=0 ifEs>Ep .
C
To obtain E , set C=0 in the second equation and solve for E:
In its phase-out range, the NIT imposes a marginal tax rate (MTR) of pQ . In the special case 
where the NIT phase-out begins immediately, ^=0, and Ee =(Cm/p0).
2. Married-couple families with low incomes are eligible for assistance in some states through 
the AFDC-UP program, but eligibility has been restrictive and participation very low. The Fami 
ly Support Act of 1988 requires all states to offer the AFDC-UP program.
3. Robert Lerman, "Nonwelfare Approaches to Helping the Poor," Focus 11,1 (Spring 1988).
4. Robert Lerman, "Nonwelfare Approaches to Helping the Poor," Focus 11,1 (Spring 1988).
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Revising EIC
Options and Effects
The overall picture of EIC that emerges from the previous chapters 
is of a program that operates quite successfully, although still on a 
relatively small scale. EIC is well-designed and it appears to operate 
efficiently. Its negative impact on individual work behavior is very small 
relative to other income-transfer programs. It has clear and significant 
advantages compared to alternative income-support programs such as 
minimum wage legislation, a wage-subsidy plan, and conventional 
welfare.
In its present form, however, EIC makes no more than a modest con 
tribution to the well-being of low-to-moderate income families. The max 
imum credit received in 1988 was only $875 and the average credit 
actually received by an eligible family was $527. l (The small impact 
on labor supply and the small average credit received are not, of course, 
unrelated.) As we have emphasized several times, this average annual 
credit is not very much more than the average monthly income available 
to nonworking families in the AFDC program. Many families with a 
full-time worker at the minimum wage are still left far below the poverty 
line, even after the credit.
As part of the growing disenchantment with conventional welfare pro 
grams like AFDC and an increasing concern with the well-being of the 
working poor, numerous proposals to expand the EIC program have 
been developed in the past few years. Virtually all legislative programs 
to address the problems of poverty and welfare dependency now prom 
inently include an expanded role for EIC. David Ell wood, one of the 
leading academic experts on the welfare system and the author of Poor 
Support, has proposed a sharp increase in the EIC subsidy rate as part 
of his overall welfare reform package. A proposal to adjust EIC benefits 
by family size was endorsed by the highly-publicized 1989 Ford Foun 
dation Report, The Common Good: Social Welfare and the American
Future. ...
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Proposals to expand EIC often appear in the body of other legisla 
tion as the mechanism by which income-related and/or child-related 
transfers are made. In the 101st Congress, both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives considered and ultimately approved major child-care 
bills that featured an expansion of the EIC program. In the House of 
Representatives, the Early Childhood Education and Development Act 
would make two major changes in the program by adjusting benefits 
by family size and also according to the age of children. 2 The Act for 
Better Child Care Services, passed by the Senate, would also adjust 
the EIC credit rate by family size, but only for families with children 
under age four. For families with older children, the provisions of the 
EIC program would be unchanged. 3 As of this writing, the two bills 
were to be considered by a House-Senate Conference Committee.
In this chapter, we look at a variety of possible changes in, and ex 
pansions of, the EIC program, including variations in phase-in and phase- 
out rates, adjustments for family size, changes in the maximum income 
on which the credit is computed, and expansion of the program to poor 
families without children. We begin by identifying the basic trade-offs 
that are inherent in attempts to revise EIC. We then consider a set of 
specific EIC alternatives and estimate the likely impacts of these alter 
natives if they had been in effect in 1988. As in chapters 2 and 3, we 
draw our estimates from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics.
Revising EIC: Basic Issues and Problems
Most proposals for reform of EIC involve an increase in the credit 
rate and/or adjustments in benefit levels for family size. The logic of 
both changes is easy to appreciate. An across-the-board increase in EIC 
would help make full-time low-wage work more attractive relative to 
welfare. In conjunction with an increase in the minimum wage, it might 
also enable many low-income families to escape from poverty. 4 It is 
argued that family size adjustments are warranted because the maximum 
credit now offered is a declining fraction of the poverty standard for 
larger families. Relative to their needs, EIC provides less assistance 
to larger families. 5
The arithmetic behind these arguments is presented in table 5.1. Col 
umn (1) shows the official 1988 poverty threshold for families ranging
Table 5.1 
Low-Wage Work, EIC, and Poverty Status in 1988
Family 
size
2
3
4
5
Poverty 
threshold8
$ 7,701
9,428
12,008
14,301
a. Estimated Poverty Thresholds, Committee on
b. Assumes 2,000 hours at wage rate of $4.25.
Year-round
full-time earnings 
+ EICb
$9,375
9,375
9,375
9,375
Ways and Means 1989, p. 941.
Credit as fraction
of poverty threshold Post-transfer income 
(%) (% of poverty threshold)
11.3 122
9.3 99
7.3 78
6.1 66
f
f
ra
o
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from two to five persons; the total income for a family with a full-time 
low-wage worker (defined here as 2000 hours at $4.25 per hour) plus 
the maximum credit of $875 is given in column (2). The table shows 
that, as a proportion of the poverty threshold, the maximum credit falls 
almost in half as family size increases from over 11 percent for a family 
of two to about 6 percent for a family of five. Families with two or 
more children remain well under the poverty threshold. 6
The figures in the table also illustrate how just large EIC credit rates 
must be in order to bring larger families with low-wage workers up 
to the poverty threshold. Even if the credit were applied to the entire 
earned income of these hypothetical families (rather than just the first 
$6,250), the required credit rate would have to be 41 percent for a family 
of four and 68 percent for a family of five. These credit rates are roughly 
three and five times the current 14 percent rate. If, instead, the credit 
were calculated on only the first $6,250 of earnings, the necessary credit 
rates would be 56 and 93 percent, respectively. 7
Issues in EIC Design
Expansion of EIC runs into many of the well-known conundrums that 
have plagued other income transfer programs, especially AFDC. While 
none are fatal, there are clearly trade-offs that must be recognized.
To aid in the discussion, figure 5.1 shows the 1988 EIC schedule 
and identifies the parameters of the schedule. Cm is the maximum credit 
($875), which was received at earnings between Em and E^ ($6,250 
and $9,830 respectively in 1988). The phase-in and phase-out rates 14 
and 10 percent, respectively are reflected by the slopes of the lines. 
The income at which the credit is completely phased-out is Ee ($18,580 
in 1988).
Consider, first, what would happen if there were an increase in the 
phase-in rate in order to assist low-income working families. If no other 
EIC parameters are changed, the higher phase-in rate means that the 
maximum earnings at which the credit can be received and thus the 
size of the EIC-eligible population will also rise. For example, a dou 
bling of the EIC phase-in rate to 28 percent would extend eligibility 
to families with earnings up to $27,330, up from $18,580. 8 Thus, not 
only will poorer families now receive larger credits, but so would
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nonpoor families on the phase-out range, as well as yet higher-income 
families who were previously ineligible. As a result, a previously in 
eligible family with an income of $22,500 would now be eligible to 
receive a credit of $483. The costs of the program thus increase substan 
tially, in large part because of the increased benefits to nonpoor and 
previously ineligible families.
Figure 5.1 
EIC Schedule 1988
$875
$6,250 $9,830 $18,580
The tempting solution to this problem is to increase the phase-out 
range to offset the increase in the phase-in rate. In this example, a dou 
bling of the phase-out rate to 20 percent is sufficient to maintain the 
maximum income for eligibility at its current level. 9 But while this solves 
one problem, it creates another: families on the phase-out range now 
face labor supply disincentives that are much more serious than before 
the two changes were imposed. Their net wage falls it is now only 
80 percent of the market wage 10 but their total income (measured at 
their current work hours) increases because the credit they receive 
increases.
As was explained in chapter 3, this combination provides a dual in 
centive for these workers to reduce their work hours. There is also an
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increased work disincentive via the income effect for workers in families 
on the stationary range, since their credit is now larger, too. It is not 
even clear that workers on the phase-in range will work more as a result 
of the larger subsidy, since they face conflicting income and substitu 
tion effects: their net wage is higher, but so is their income.
There is no simple solution to this problem. If EIC benefits to lower- 
income families are to be increased, then either increased benefits will 
go to higher-income families and EIC expenditures will increase substan 
tially or else moderate-income families will face increased labor supp 
ly disincentives. 11 Below we provide some quantitative information on 
the magnitude of the trade-offs.
EIC includes two additional program parameters that can be varied 
in any revision the maximum earnings on which the credit is calculated 
(Em) and the earnings at which the phase-out of the credit begins (Ej,). 
Increasing either (or both) extends the size of the EIC-eligible popula 
tion by increasing the maximum income (Eg) at which a credit can be 
received. An increase in E,, increases this maximum income dollar for 
dollar, while an increase in Em increases it by the ratio of p{ to p0 . With 
the current phase-in and phase-out rates, this means that each $1 in 
crease in Em increases the maximum income cutoff by $1.40. 12
To see clearly the effects of changes in these parameters, consider 
a proposal to increase Em from its current $6,250 to, say, $7,500, with 
no change in Ej, or in the phase-in or phase-out rates. This would pro 
duce a higher credit ($175 more) for all EIC families with earnings above 
$6,250 and would push the income limit for eligibility up to $20,330. 13 
Work hours for this group would probably fall slightly they are richer 
at their current hours of work and their net wage is unchanged. For 
the poorest group of EIC workers those with incomes below 
$6,250 the increase in Em would have no effect on either income or 
labor supply.
Raising Ej, alone would provide no additional benefits for workers 
hi families on the phase-in and stationary ranges. It would increase the 
credit only for workers in families on the phase-out range that is, the 
higher-income EIC families and would therefore provide an increas 
ed work disincentive via the income effect. It would also increase the 
maximum income limit for EIC eligibility.
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Family Size Adjustments
Table 5.1 showed that maximum EIC benefits ranged from 11.3 per 
cent of the poverty threshold for a family of two to 6.1 percent for a 
family of five. Table 5.2 shows two different ways that the maximum 
credit could be adjusted in order to provide benefits to all families equal 
to the 11.3 percent of the poverty threshold that EIC now provides for 
a family of two. 14 Column (3) shows how such a credit would vary 
with family size; it ranges from the current $875 for a family of two 
to $1,623 for a family of five. In column (4), we show the necessary 
EIC phase-in rates, assuming that the maximum income on which the 
credit is applied does not vary by family size. The rates start at the cur 
rent 14 percent and then rise at between 3 and 5 percentage points per 
additional family member, reaching 26 percent for a family of five. 
Column (5) shows how to accomplish the same thing in a different way 
by varying the maximum income on which the credit can be earned 
rather than the credit rate. Again, there is substantial variation by family 
size.
Table 5.2 
Alternative EIC Family Size Adjustments
Family 
size
2
3
4
5
Poverty 
threshold8
$ 7,701
9,428
12,008
14,301
Maximum 
creditb
$ 875
1,070
1,363
1,623
Phase-in 
ratec
14.0%
17.1
21.8
26.0
Earnings 
threshold (Em)
$ 6,250
7,643
9,736
11,593
a. Estimated, 1988.
b. Maximum credit set equal to 11.3 percent of poverty threshold.
c. Assumes earnings threshold for credit equals $6,250.
d. Assumes credit rate of 14 percent.
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If EIC benefits are adjusted for family size, consideration may also 
be given to the idea of extending eligibility to families without children. 
In 1988, about 40 percent of working poor households (about one-quarter 
of all poor households) were ineligible for EIC because they did not 
have children. 15 Since the poverty threshold for these smaller families 
is substantially less than for larger families, lower benefits would cer 
tainly be appropriate.
Revising EIC: Plans and Findings
In this section, we first describe a set of specific revisions of EIC, 
and then estimate the likely impact of each using the PSID data. The 
plans we consider are listed in table 5.3; the top half includes the EIC 
as it actually was in 1988 plus three variations that do not include family- 
size adjustments, while the bottom half includes four plans with various 
adjustments for family size. Because the official poverty index is bas 
ed on family size, we make adjustments on that basis rather than in 
terms of the number of children.
Plan IA in table 5.3 is the 1988 EIC law, with a phase-in rate of 14 
percent, phase-out rate of 10 percent, and a stationary range running 
from $6,250 to $9,830. We include it in all the analyses to provide a 
frame of reference. In IB, both the phase-in and phase-out rates are 
doubled, but the stationary range is unchanged. The maximum credit 
doubles, but the income limit for eligibility remains unchanged at 
$18,580. 1C also incorporates a doubling of the phase-in rate, but the 
phase-out rate is kept at 10 percent. As a result, while the maximum 
credit for plan 1C is identical to IB, the income eligibility level is substan 
tially higher. Finally, in ID the phase-in rate is kept at the current 14 
percent, but the earnings on which the credit is computed is increased 
by 50 percent to $9,375, and the phase-out rate is also increased by 
50 percent to 15 percent. Together, these changes yield a maximum 
credit of $1,313 (a 50 percent increase), while keeping the size of the 
eligible population unchanged.
In the bottom half of the table, plan IIA applies the current EIC 
parameters to single parents with one child and then increases the credit 
rate by 4 percentage points for each additional family member through 
the fourth in single parent families and the fifth in married-couple
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families. The resulting phase-in rates 14, 18, 22, and 26 percent- 
are very similar to those that table 5.2 showed would, when applied 
to the 1988 income threshold of $6,250, produce a maximum credit 
that was a constant proportion of the poverty rate for families from two 
to five persons. This change would increase the maximum credit by 
$250 per person and the maximum income for EIC eligibility by $2,500 
per person (up to the specified family size limits). Thus, as the table 
shows, a family of five or more would be eligible for EIC benefits up 
to an income of $26,100 in 1988.
HE uses the same phase-in rates as in HA, but it adjusts the phase- 
out rate for each family size so as to maintain the current income eligibili 
ty limit. Thus, in this version, a family of three would face a phase-in 
rate of 18 percent and a phase-out rate of 12.9 percent, while a family 
of four would have phase-in and phase-out rates of 22 and 15.7 per 
cent, respectively. 16 EC is identical to IIA in all respects, except that 
it extends eligibility to married-couple families without children, with 
a credit rate of 12 percent. Finally, IID keeps the credit rate at 14 per 
cent for all families, but increases the income threshold used to com 
pute the credit by about $1,800 per person. With these thresholds, the 
maximum credit by family size is exactly the same as those in HA. Note, 
though, that the maximum income for eligibility is slightly higher for 
larger families than in HA. 17
Of the plans considered here, IIB is closest to the EIC expansion in 
cluded in the child-care bill passed by the House of Representatives. 
The phase-in rates used in IIB are uniformly three points lower than 
in the House bill except for married couples with three children, where 
the rates are a point higher, and the phase-out rates considered here 
are slightly lower than in the House bill. 18 In both cases, however, the 
phase-in rate is designed so that it is 1.4 times the phase-out rate  
exactly the ratio in the 1990 law so that the resulting maximum in 
come threshold for eligibility is the same in both plans. 19 The major 
difference between Plan IIB and the House version is that IIB does not 
include the supplemental "young child" credit, and thus is less generous.
Our estimates of the impact of all of the plans are presented in table 
5.4. The procedures used are exactly the same as those used in chapter 
2 to generate the descriptive information about the 1988 EIC popula-
Table 5.3 
Summary of Alternative EIC Plan Characteristics
Income threshold 
Phase-in for maximum Maximum 
rate credit credit 
Plan (%) ($) ($)
Income 
threshold 
for phase-out
($)
Phase-out 
rate
(%)
Income 
threshold 
for eligibility
($)
No family size adjustment
IA
IB
1C
ID
Family size adjustment
DA
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children ) 
Married, 1 child j
Single, 3+ children ) 
Married, 2 children /
Married, 3+ children
IIB
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children) 
Married, 1 child )
14
28
28
14
14
18
22
26
14
18
6,250
6,250
6,250
9,375
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
875
1,750
1,750
1,313
875
1,125
1,375
1,625
8.75
1,125
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
10
20
10
15
10
10
10
10
10
12.9
18,580
18,580
27,330
18,580
18,580
21,080
23,580
26,100
18,580
18,580
w
Single, 3 + children ) 
Married, 2 children /
Married, 3+ children
nc
Married, no child
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children ^ 
Married, 1 child J
Single, 3 4- children ) 
Married, 2 children f
Married, 3+ children
no
Single, 1 child
Single, 2 children ) 
Married, 1 child /
Single, 3+ children ) 
Married, 2 children f
Married, 3+ children
22
26
12
14
18
22
26
14
14
14
14
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
6,250
8,036
9,830
11,610
1,375
1,625
750
875
1,125
1,375
1,625
875
1,125
1,375
1,625
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
9,830
10,330
12,110
15.7
18.6
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
18,580
18,580
17,350
18,580
21,080
23,580
26,100
18,580
21,080
24,070
28,350
2?<
£2.
cro
W
0
Table 5.4 
Simulation Results for Alternative EIC Plans8
a. See table 5.3 for characteristics of plans.
b. Total cost for 1988 EIC from Committee on Ways and Means, 1989, p. 793, table 12. Total cost for other plans computed relative to 1988 costs.
Estimated costs do not incorporate labor supply adjustments.
Share of total credits 
received by
Plan
IA
IB
1C
ID
HA
nB
nc
no
% families 
eligible
10.7
10.7
17.4
10.7
13.6
10.7
16.2
14.0
Average 
credit
($)
486
973
919
650
631
640
600
595
Total 
costb
($)
5.8b
11.6
17.8
7.8
9.6
7.6
10.8
9.3
Poor 
families
(%)
25.4
25.4
17.0
22.1
22.2
26.9
21.2
18.8
Families with 
income 
< $15,000
(%)
80.8
80.8
63.4
81.5
72.3
80.6
70.7
69.2
2!
(TO 
W
Labor supply effect n
Recipients
(%)
-2.1
-4.2
-3.2
-2.5
-2.6
-2.8
-2.5
-2.6
Aggregate
(%)
-.20
-.40
-.55
-.25
-.34
-.27
-.39
-.35
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tion and in chapter 3 to estimate labor supply effects. The table shows 
the fraction of families that would be eligible for EIC, the average credit 
that would be received, and the share of total EIC credits received by 
poor families and by families with income less than $15,000. There 
are also two labor supply estimates, one for recipients only and a sec 
ond for the economy as a whole. The latter measure is especially useful 
for comparing plans in which the size of the eligible population dif 
fers. All of the findings pertain to 1988; they show what the effects 
of each variation would have been if they had been in effect in 1988.
The figures in the first row (IA) are for the actual 1988 EIC law. 
The total cost $5.8 billion is the IRS estimate (Committee on Ways 
and Means 1989, p.793); all of the other figures are from PSID tabula 
tions. 20 Most of the numbers in the first row have been presented earlier; 
the last entry shows that the 1988 EIC probably reduced total labor supply 
in the economy by about 0.2 percent. This reflects both the coverage 
of the EIC in 1988 and its average effect among recipients.
Plan IB, in which the phase-in and phase-out rates are doubled, pro 
duces an average credit, total cost, and labor supply reduction that are 
exactly twice as high as IA, while leaving the composition of the reci 
pient population unchanged. 21
1C is the most expensive alternative considered. Its 28 percent phase-in 
rate and 10 percent phase-out rate result in an average credit of $919 
and almost a doubling of the size of the EIC- eligible population, up 
to 17.4 percent. It is more than three times as expensive as the 1988 
law and more than $6 billion more than IB.
Relative to IB, the additional costs in this plan reflect the higher credits 
received by families on the phase-out range and the substantial increase 
in the income limit for eligibility; families on the phase-in and stationary 
ranges receive exactly the same credit in both plans. This compositional 
change can be seen as well in the sharp fall in the share of total credits 
received by poor families and low-to-middle income families in this plan.
The possible attractiveness of a plan like 1C can be seen in the next- 
to-last column. While its adverse effect on the labor supply of recipients 
is larger than in the current EIC, it is not as large as for plan IB. At 
the same time, though, its aggregate labor supply effect is larger than 
both LA and IB because the size of the recipient population is so large. 22
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This comparison illustrates the trade-off between individual and ag 
gregate labor supply effects: changes that improve the former very often 
worsen the latter.
Finally, ID (raising the income level for computing the credit by 50 
percent and the phase-out rate from 10 to 15 percent) is the least ex 
pensive of the plans that do not involve any family size adjustment. 
It provides a somewhat smaller share of credits to poor families for 
whom the expansion of the income level is less valuable. Because it 
is more generous on average than the 1988 law, it does cause a further 
reduction in labor supply, but the effect is quite small.
The four family-size-related plans in the bottom half of the table are, 
in some ways, quite similar to one another. All are more generous than 
the 1988 law, but there is little difference among them: average credits 
range from a low of $595 (ED) to a high of $640 (HB). The predicted 
individual labor supply effects are also quite similar, running about 25 
percent higher than in the 1988 EIC. The estimated total cost in 1988 
ranges from a low of $7.8b for IIB, which has the smallest eligible 
population, to $10.8b for EC, which has the largest eligible population.
Aggregate labor supply effects differ somewhat more because of dif 
ferences in the size of the covered population. In this respect, EC, which 
provides the broadest coverage, is the worst with an aggregate effect 
nearly twice as large as the 1988 law. With the exception of plan IIB, 
where coverage is the same as in LA, all of these plans involve aggregate 
labor supply effects that are substantial compared to the current law. 
Even so, the labor supply effects of these plans still seem relatively 
small. The estimated effects are less than 3 percent for recipients and 
less than 0.4 percent when measured on an aggregate basis.
Our estimates suggest that none of the family-size-adjusted plans in 
volve shockingly large cost increases. We estimate that the least generous 
version (IIB, which increases phase-out rates along with phase-in rates) 
would cost about $1.8b more than the 1988 EIC law and the most 
generous (IIC, which does not raise phase-out rates and also includes 
married-couple families without children) would cost about $5b more. 
Comparing HA and EC, it appears that expansion to married-couple 
families without children is relatively inexpensive; we estimate a 
marginal cost of about $1.2b. 23
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In terms of targeting credits on poorer families, nB is clearly the best. 
Indeed, it is very similar in this regard to the 1988 law, while all of 
the other family-size-related plans are much worse. This latter finding 
reflects the higher phase-in rates and low phase-out rate that are used 
in all of the plans except HE. 24
Finally, the comparison of IIA and IID plans that offer the same 
maximum credit in different ways is interesting. We find that the two 
plans would have very similar effects. IIA has a higher average credit, 
but ED has a larger eligible population, so the total costs are very close 
to one another. Predicted labor supply effects are identical. The one 
difference, which we have seen before, is that a plan like IID, that in 
creases the income on which the credit is based, provides relatively less 
to poorer families than a plan like IIA, that increases credit rates.
Table 5.5 provides some additional details about the distribution of 
benefits under Plans HA-IID. For each of the plans and for the 1988 
EIC, the table shows the estimated average credit and the fraction of 
the EIC-eligible population by family size, marital status, and race.
Under the 1988 law, the pattern of credits by family size has an unex 
pected U-shaped pattern the largest average benefits go to two per 
son families and those with five or more persons. Since the 1988 law 
did not adjust benefits for family size in any way, this can only reflect 
the relationship between family income and family size. 25 The higher 
credits for the smallest and largest families reflect family incomes that 
place them relatively near the stationary range where the maximum credit 
is received. This shows up clearly in the PSID data: average earned 
income by family size is $8,557 for two person families, $10140 for 
three person families, $10,973 for four person families, and $9,757 
for families with five or more persons.
Without exception and not surprisingly, families of three or more per 
sons do fare better under these plans than under the 1988 law. The in 
creases range from about 30 percentfor families of three to more than 
60 percent for families for five or more. Still, the relationship between 
family size and family income has a major impact on the way the four 
family-size-adjusted plans perform. Despite the uniform family-size ad 
justments built into the formulas, the average credit does not, in fact, 
increase smoothly with family size. For three of the plans, the average
Table 5.5
Population Characteristics and Average Credit Received 
EIC Plans with Alternative Family Size Adjustments
Characteristic
All
Family size 
Two persons 
Three persons 
Four persons 
Five or more
Marital status
Married with
children
Married, no
children
Single parent, 
with children
Race
White
Black
IA
% of EIC 
population
100
27.9 
41.2 
18.9 
12.0
43.5
 
56.5
70.1
29.9
Avg. 
credit
486
504 
487 
435 
520
482
 
489
478
505
IIA
% of EIC 
population
100
22.1 
37.2 
24.7 
16.0
52.5
~
47.5
72.9
29.1
Avg. 
credit
631
504 
633 
622 
814
670
 
587
621
657
IIB
% of EIC 
population
100
27.9 
41.2 
18.9 
12.0
43.5
 
56.5
70.1
29.9
Avg. 
credit
640
504 
626 
685 
934
723
-
577
637
649
nc
% of EIC 
population
100
34.7 
31.2 
20.7 
13.4
44.0
16.2
39.8
75.4
24.6
Avg. 
credit
600
474 
633 
622 
814
670
439
587
585
644
1ID
% of EIC 
population
100
21.4 
36.0 
23.8 
18.8
54.1
-
45.9
73.4
26.6
Avg. 
credit
595
504 
594 
580
717
632
--
551
590
606
s
n
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
NOTE: See table 5.3 for characteristics of plans.
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credit actually falls as family size rises from three to four, and it then 
rises very sharply for families of five or more.
The different plans also yield population distributions that are quite 
different. IA and HB (which are identical in terms of composition) in 
clude far fewer large families than any of the other plans. EC, which 
includes childless married-couple families, is as a result much more 
heavily composed of small families; it is also apparent that its lower 
average credit is entirely due to the inclusion of these families.
The plans with higher income eligibility (EA, EC, and ED) have EIC 
populations that are more heavily composed of married-couple families, 
since those families typically have higher average incomes. Compared 
to the 1988 law, the relative proportions of married- vs. single-parent 
families in HA. and ED are almost exactly reversed, and EC has an even 
higher proportion of married-couple families.
Finally, race differences across the plans appear to be relatively small. 
Average credits for black families are consistently higher than for white 
families, but the difference is relatively small 2 to 10 percent and 
it does not vary much across the plans. Extension of eligibility to childless 
married-couple families appears to benefit white families much more 
than black families. When that change is made (plan EC), the propor 
tion of the EIC population that is white rises from 70 to 75 percent.
Summary
In this chapter we have explored a series of revisions and extensions 
of the 1988 EIC law. In its current form, EIC provides benefits that 
are large enough to bring a family of three persons with a full-time low- 
wage worker almost up to the poverty threshold, but larger families 
are left far below that level. Since the maximum credit takes no ac 
count of family size, EIC benefits are necessarily a much smaller frac 
tion of the poverty threshold for larger families.
EIC can be revised along a number of dimensions. Family-size ad 
justments and/or across-the-board increases are especially emphasized 
in recent legislative proposals. While these increases may be warranted, 
we note that they introduce in a more serious form some of the labor 
supply, coverage, and cost problems that have plagued other income- 
transfer programs.
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In the last part of the chapter, we took a close look at a serious of 
specific EIC alternatives. The alternatives encompassed increases in 
phase-in and phase-out rates, increases in coverage, and a variety of 
adjustments for family size. All of the plans we considered were more 
generous than the 1988 EIC, and all involved estimated labor supply 
effects that were, as a result, more negative than the 1988 law. Estimated 
increases in costs ranged from about $2.Ob to over $12b. We estimate 
that adjustments for family size, along the lines of a number of recent 
EIC proposals, would cost about $4 billion to $5 billion more than the 
1988 EIC plan.
NOTES
1. See chapter 2 for further details on the distribution of EIC benefits in 1988.
2. Effective in 1991, the EIC phase-in rate would be increased to 17 percent for a family with 
one child, to 21 percent for a family with two children, and to 25 percent for a family with three 
or more children, with associated phase-out rates of 12, IS, and 18 percent. In addition, a sup 
plemental "young child" credit of 6 percent would be available to families with a child under 
the age of six; the supplemental credit would be phased-out at a rate of 4.25 percent. Thus, a 
family of three or more with two young children would have a combined phase-in rate of 31 per 
cent and a combined phase-out rate of 22.25 percent. With this pattern of phase-in and phase-out 
rates, the maximum income for eligibility is about $21,000 in all cases; this is essentially un 
changed from what the maximum would be for 1991 with the current EIC law.
3. The credit rates would be 21 percent for families with one child under age four and 24 percent 
for families with two or more children under age four.
4. As we have emphasized earlier, an increase in EIC is almost certainly a substitute for and 
preferable to an increase in the minimum wage. Recent proposals often recognize this substitutability 
by linking more modest increases in the minimum wage to increases in EIC.
5. The uniform treatment of families of different size presumably reflects the initial concern with 
offsetting payroll taxes for low-wage workers.
6. The poverty gap for this family of four is $2,634. For a family of five persons, the poverty 
gap is $4,927.
7. For a family of four with an earned income of $8,500, the pre-EIC poverty gap is $3,508; 
for a family of five, it is $5,801. The EIC credit rates in the text, applied either to $8,500 or 
$6,250, yield these amounts.
8. The new maximum earnings is easy to calculate. The EIC benefit formula is C=pjEm - pQ 
(AGI-Eu), where AGI is adjusted gross income, p; is the phase-in rate, p is the phase-out rate, 
and the other terms are as defined in the text. Setting the credit equal to 0 and solving for AGI 
(Ee in figure 5.1), we have Ee =Eb +(p/p0)Em. For ^=$9,830, Em =$6,250, P0 =.10, and 
Pj = .28, the maximum adjusted gross income at which the credit can be received is $27,330.
9. The expression for Eg in footnote 8 shows that if E^ and Em are unchanged, Eg is unchanged 
as long as the ratio of PJ to p0 is constant. Thus, if both p; and p0 are doubled (or halved, etc.), 
the cut-off point for eligibility will be unchanged.
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10. We are continuing to ignore positive taxes. Including federal income taxes, the net wage would 
be only 65 percent of the market wage.
11. This problem has been debated repeatedly in the context of the design of AFDC. High benefit 
reduction rates limit the size of the eligible population, but generate strong labor supply disincen 
tives for those who are eligible. Low benefit reduction rates improve labor supply incentives, 
but expand the pool of eligible families. Historically, the program began with high rates and low 
eligibility, moved to lower rates and increased eligibility, and then in the 1980s returned to something 
very close to the original configuration.
12. Again, this is clear from the expression for Ee in footnote 8.
13. From footnote 8, the formula for the maximum income at which the credit can be received 
is Ee =Eb +(p/p0)Em . For Em =$7,500, ^=$9,830, Pj=.14, and P0 =.10, the maximum ad 
justed gross income at which the credit can be received is $20,330.
14. There is nothing magical about the 11.3 percent figure. We use it here because it is the highest 
percentage given to a family under the 1988 law.
15. If the thrust of EIC is to help poor working families, then there is no particularly compelling 
reason to exclude families without children.
16. With these changes, the ratio of phase-in to phase-out rate is the same regardless of family 
size. Thus, as seen earlier, the maximum income threshold will be the same for each family size.
17. This happens because the income used to compute the credit is higher than the current phase- 
out income threshold for the larger families. The stationary range is set equal to $500 for these 
families.
18. Note that Iffi bases its credits on family size rather than number of children, as in the House bill.
19. The 1.4:1 ratio holds strictly in OB and approximately in the House bill. The two plans would 
have virtually identical thresholds if both were applied to 1991. The income maximums for IIB 
in table 5.3 refer to 1988.
20. The average credit amounts shown are from the PSID and are about 9 percent lower than 
those reported by the IRS.
21. The labor supply doubling reflects the linear nature of the response estimates in the SIME/DIME 
research.
22. These labor supply comparisons require some additional clarification. For workers on the 
phase-in and stationary ranges, the labor supply effects of IB and 1C are identical, since the credit 
they receive and net wage rate are the same. For workers on the phase-out range, 1C provides 
a larger credit and a higher net wage, both by virtue of the lower phase-out rate. This leads to 
conflicting income and substitution effects, so that the net effect for them is uncertain. For the 
newly-eligible workers in 1C, predicted labor supply falls unambiguously, but the change is relatively 
small since the dollar amounts involved are small. The decline in the average labor supply effect 
per recipient is, therefore, primarily the result of extending coverage to workers with lower-than- 
average responses.
23. The two plans are identical except for this provision.
24. It may be inappropriate to use a fixed dollar figure ($15,000) to evaluate a plan that is based 
on differences in poverty thresholds by family size. It might be better to consider the fraction 
of benefits received by families with an income that is less than, say, one-and-a-half times the 
poverty threshold.
25. If income were unrelated to family size, the average credit would not vary by family size.

6
How to Increase the EIC 
Participation Rate
In this chapter, we address a central practical problem for the Earn 
ed Income Credit: How to raise the participation rate for households 
entitled to EIC credit. Thanks to an IRS checking procedure, households 
that file a tax return are almost certain to receive any EIC credit to which 
they are entitled, even if they neglect to claim the credit. The more 
serious participation problem involves households that do not file a tax 
return.
Households that file a return are alerted to the EIC. At the bottom 
of page 1 of both the 1989 1040 tax return and the simplified 1040A 
return, it states:
This is your adjusted gross income. If this line is less than 
$19,340 and a child lived with you, see "Earned Income 
Credit."
Page 2 of both the tax returns contains the line, "Earned income 
credit." Surprisingly, this line is not in the Credits section of the return 
but in the Payments section where it is added to taxes withheld, so the 
taxpayer may well be confused about what the EIC is. 1 However, if 
the taxpayer consults the instruction booklet, he will find how to com 
pute his EIC using the EIC table. We suggest shifting the EIC to the 
credits section of the return so that its meaning is clearer. Claiming 
the EIC has not simply been left to the taxpayer. Even if a household 
neglects to claim its EIC credit, it is IRS policy to check each filed tax 
return for EIC eligibility and grant the credit if the household is enti 
tled to it. Because of this important IRS policy, households that file 
returns should get any EIC credit to which they are entitled, although 
some may not understand why they received the credit.
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The Problem of Nonfilers
But what of the household that does not file a tax return? An impor 
tant achievement of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the exempting 
of many low-income households from the income tax by significantly 
raising the personal exemption and standard deduction. For example, 
in 1990 a family of four with income less than $13,650 would not owe 
any tax. But an ironic by-product of this attempt to help low-income 
households is that many may not receive the EIC credit to which they 
are entitled because they do not file a return. The 1040 instruction booklet 
encourages low-income households to file in order to obtain the EIC, 
but many nonfilers probably never check the 1040 instruction booklet.
In our judgment, the most important way to reach potential nonfilers 
is through their employers. The IRS currently tries to use employers 
to alert these households. The Internal Revenue Service's Circular E, 
the Employer's Tax Guide, is the tax instructions booklet for employers. 
The section entitled "Advance Payment of the Earned Income Credit" 
states:
You are required to notify employees not having income 
tax withheld that they may be eligible for a tax refund because 
of the EIC. This is because the amount of EIC that exceeds 
tax liability is refunded. However, you will not have to notify 
employees claiming exemption from withholding on Form 
W-4.
Which employees can claim exemption from withholding on Form 
W-4? The Employer's Tax Guide says:
Exemption from income tax withholding for eligible per 
sons. An employee may claim to be exempt from income 
tax withholding because he or she had no income tax liabili 
ty last year and expects none this year.
Surprisingly, then, the employer does not have to notify many 
employees who most need to be reached. Clearly, the employer should 
be required to notify these employees. The EIC section continues:
You can notify your employees by giving them Notice 797, 
Notice of a Possible Federal Tax Refund Due to the Earned 
Income Credit (EIC).
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Should the Advance Payment System Be Terminated?
How can employers be made more effective in distributing the EIC 
notice? One obstacle may be that the employer must currently accept 
the administrative burden of providing advance payments of the earn 
ed income tax credit. In fact, the section of the Employer's Tax Guide 
on the EIC begins:
Employees eligible for the earned income credit (EIC) may 
either receive it on their tax returns on in advance payments 
during the year. Those who want it in advance must file Form 
W-5 with you.
The employer must then follow several single-spaced columns of in 
structions on how to administer advance payments. It is possible that 
some employers, especially in smaller business firms, will regard the 
advance payment system of EIC as a burden worth avoiding. The 
simplest way to avoid the burden is to fail to inform one's employees 
about the EIC, so there is no chance they will request advance payments.
How does the advance payment system work? Interested employees 
can file a W-5 form ("Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Cer 
tificate") with the employer. The W-5 form asks the employee whether 
he/she expects household adjusted gross income to be less than $20,264 
(in 1990). If the employee answers "yes" to both questions, then the 
employee can receive advance payments of EIC.
The advance payments are a kind of negative withholding. The 
Employer's Tax Guide instructs the employer how to make these 
payments.
Figuring the Advance EIC Payment. You must include 
the advance EIC payment with wages paid to eligible 
employees who have filed Form W-5. . . . Figure the amount 
of the payment to include in eligible employees' wage 
payments by using the tables ....
Generally, employers will pay the amount of the advance 
EIC payment from withheld income taxes and social securi 
ty taxes. ... If for any payroll period the advance EIC 
payments are more than the withheld income tax and social 
security taxes, you may (a) reduce each advance EIC pay-
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ment proportionately, or (b) elect to make full payment of 
the advance EIC amount and have these full amounts treated 
as an advance payment of the employer's tax liability.
On the W-5 form, the employee must indicate whether his/her spouse 
is obtaining advance EIC payments. If so, then the employer uses a 
table that results in a smaller advance EIC payment for that employee. 
The vehicle for implementing the EIC advance payment is the 
Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return.
While the current advance payment option strives for the ambitious 
goal of including the EIC credit with each pay check, in practice it has 
hardly been utilized (only 10,000 out of 6.3 million families in 1986) 
so most households receive their EIC payment once a year from the 
IRS. Nevertheless, it is possible that an important fraction of employers 
may refrain from notifying their employees about the EIC in order to 
avoid a possible request for advance payment.
Even if the advance payments option did not deter employers from 
publicizing the existence of the EIC, the advance payment system runs 
counter to a central feature of the EIC: basing assistance on total 
household income. An employer can have accurate information only 
on the compensation he pays to one household member. He cannot know 
the earnings of other household members, or whether the household 
earns property income. Thus, it is quite possible that a household would 
obtain more EIC advance payment credits than its annual income would 
justify.
Such a low-income household would then be required to return the 
excess to the IRS. In practice, however, this household may find it ex 
tremely difficult to return the excess. Moreover, the household may 
have misunderstood the advance payment, assuming incorrectly that it 
need never be repaid. What penalty would the IRS levy on a household 
that does not return the excess?
Of course, the intent of the advance payment system is understan 
dable: to speed payment to low-earning households that need assistance 
and are entitled to it under the EIC program. But this benefit must be 
balanced against two costs: employers may resist notifying employees 
about the EIC to avoid the burden of administering advance payments, 
and advance payment may burden some households with unexpected 
required repayment or punishment.
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In light of these considerations, we recommend that serious considera 
tion be given to terminating the advance payment system. Its termina 
tion will affect only a very small fraction of EIC recipients (0.2 per 
cent in 1986). But it may significantly increase the willingness of 
employers to publicize the EIC to employees, thereby raising the EIC 
participation rate.
If the advance payment system were terminated, then the instructions 
to employers concerning the EIC could be greatly simplified. In place 
of the current detailed advance payment instructions, the Employer's 
Tax Guide might contain just one paragraph. In addition, this paragraph 
and notice 797 could be mailed out annually in the first quarter of each 
year. The paragraph would read:
You are required to distribute notice 797 to each employee 
every January. Notice 797 informs the employee about the 
Earned Income Credit, a credit on the personal income tax. 
You have no other obligation concerning the EIC except to 
distribute a copy of this notice to every employee.
NOTE
1. Of course, the current method does give the correct amount still owed by the taxpayer. By 
inclusion in the Payments section, the EIC is treated as though it were tax already paid, just as 
taxes withheld are taxes already paid. By this treatment, the EIC does reduce the amount still 
owed by the taxpayer by the correct amount. But it would be clearer to include the EIC in the 
Credits section, so that it would be seen as a credit from the government to the household due 
to the household's labor earnings.
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